Lippmann: Finance workers must figure out how to add value before expecting training
“This isn't summer camp, like we're paying you, you're not paying us. So like figure out, and that's what I learned from him, figure out how to add value. And then along the way, we'll train you as opposed to it's our job to train you.”
Lippmann is happy with Ryan Gosling playing him in The Big Short
“I certainly don't think I was portrayed as somebody who wasn't smart, and so that, I can't complain, and like I said before, you can't really complain if one of the sexiest men alive plays you in a movie.”
Liar's Poker inspired Greg Lippmann to join Wall Street despite its warnings
“So the beginning of the book, The Big Short, he said, well, he wrote Liar's Poker as a cautionary tale. He didn't want people to go into Wall Street, is what he thought. And people read that book, including me, and said, this is exactly what I want to do, righ…”
Lippmann: LibreMax uses AI and quantitative models solely as screening tools
“We're not a quant shop in the sense that we don't take that price, but what we use this for is a sifting mechanism, right? So we'll put 10 bonds through the system, and that system will say, hey, I think you should buy these five, and you should avoid these fi…”
Lippmann: Only 3 of 20 most likely LP prospects invested in LibreMax launch
“If you had given me the list of, say, 40 people I called, and you told me, write a list of the 20 most likely and the 20 least likely, I would have got, like, three right. Like, three of the 20 most likely gave me money, and 17 of the 20 least likely gave me m…”
Lippmann told Deutsche Bank to fire him rather than unwind his subprime short
“I had to maintain my position at the bank and not everyone at the bank agreed with it at all times. I ultimately had to, if anything, say, you know, I'm not taking it off. Fire me if you want, but I'm not taking it off.”
Lippmann: Subprime short took over a year to reprice, moving in February 2007
“February of 2007, the prices started to move, and I began to have a little bit of notoriety for the trade. So I had been involved in the trade for over a year before it worked in any sort of meaningful way.”
Lippmann: Slow-growth 2000-vintage mortgages had 28% defaults and 50%+ losses
“But if you looked at the bottom quartile for houses, they were going up three to four percent per year, and 28% of the people were defaulting. And we were losing 50, 55 cents on the dollar when they did, because of the similar type of slippage.”
Lippmann: 2000-vintage mortgages in booming regions had 6-7% default rates
“What we saw was that after six years,
The default rate in places in the top quartile where homes were going up 12 to 14% a year, the default rate was still six or seven percent.”
Lippmann: In 1991 banks manually phoned mortgage servicers to track delinquencies
“And at the time there was no Bloomberg really. Bloomberg was existed, but it was a very, very minor thing. And all the banks had their own internal mortgage backed security departments and whatnot. And so there was a huge demand for people to Call up the mortg…”