Lippmann: Only 3 of 20 most likely LP prospects invested in LibreMax launch
Greg Lippmann · Greg Lippmann – The Big Short and Structured Credit at LibreMax (Capital Allocators, EP.270) · Sep 12, 2022 · at 26:08
Greg Lippmann reflects on launching LibreMax Capital in 2010 and approaching former trading counterparties from his famous subprime short trade to raise capital.
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“If you had given me the list of, say, 40 people I called, and you told me, write a list of the 20 most likely and the 20 least likely, I would have got, like, three right. Like, three of the 20 most likely gave me money, and 17 of the 20 least likely gave me money”
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