Jan 2, 2019 · 28m · a16z
a16z Podcast | Centers of Power, War, and History
0:00 / 0:00
▶ Watch on YouTube →
gold bands on the timeline = statements, start to end. Hover to read, click to jump. CC turns on captions
In this episode of the a16z Podcast, host Matt Colford interviews political scientist Graham Allison about U.S.-China relations, examining technological competition, institutional rivalries, and historical flashpoints through the lens of the Thucydides Trap.
How this conversation actually went
Every chapter scored 0–10 on four independent dynamics. Hover any point for the reasoning behind the score. How this is scored →
The host as informed peer 4.6 Guest teaching 5.7 Guest disagreement 1.4 The host pushing back 1.1
speaking balance: gold is the host, purple is the guest (3 minute bins)
Sharpest disagreement ▶ 5:00 Lee Kuan Yew's Reframe on Chinese Ambition
Guest forcefully rejects any ambiguous framing of China's goals by quoting Lee Kuan Yew's direct assertion that China obviously intends to displace US power.
Hardest push from the host ▶ 4:18 Host Challenges Trap with US-India ExampleHost pushes back on the inevitability of power-transition conflict by introducing the US-India relationship as a counter-example of nuclear powers that avoided war.
Biggest teaching moment ▶ 24:48 Guest Explains Hierarchical World OrderGuest educates the host and audience on the underlying Confucian philosophical structure of Chinese order versus Western Westphalian balance of power.
The host holds their own ▶ 7:56 Host Cites Firsthand NSC Committee ExperienceHost demonstrates deep domain expertise by detailing his firsthand experience sitting in White House Deputy and Principal Committee meetings on Asia policy.
the scores for every segment, with the reasoning behind each
| Chapter | Topic | The host as informed peer | Guest teaching | Guest disagreement | The host pushing back | Why |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Understanding the Thucydides Trap | 1 | 5 | 1 | 0 | Host opens with a standard setup question asking for definitions of Thucydides and the Thucydides Trap. Guest provides an educational historical overview of Ancient Greece and his study of 16 power transition cases. | |
| US-China vs. US-India Dynamic | 5 | 6 | 2 | 2 | Host demonstrates expertise by introducing the US-India relationship as a smart comparative case study. Guest reframes the point using quotes from Lee Kuan Yew and economic metrics like purchasing power parity. | |
| Tech Innovation & Infrastructure Velocity | 6 | 5 | 1 | 2 | Host demonstrates insider experience by recalling National Security Council meeting topics during the Obama administration's pivot to Asia. Guest illustrates Chinese infrastructure velocity with the 43-hour bridge reconstruction example. | |
| Institutional Friction: World Bank, IMF, & AIIB | 6 | 5 | 1 | 1 | Host cites specific terminology from the guest's book like transitional friction and offers an apt middle school baseball metaphor. Guest explains the post-WWII international order and voting share dynamics at the World Bank and IMF. | |
| Lessons of the Cold War & Cyber Warfare | 5 | 6 | 2 | 2 | Host asks whether the US and China are already in a covert Cold War, framing covert actions as historical safety valves. Guest delivers a history lesson on George Kennan and the Marshall Plan before confirming a current cyber Cold War. | |
| Parallel Visions: Xi Jinping and Donald Trump | 6 | 6 | 1 | 1 | Host draws sharp historical comparisons between Xi Jinping and Teddy Roosevelt's sense of manifest destiny. Guest elaborates with a detailed historical account of Teddy Roosevelt's aggressive territorial expansionism in Panama and Alaska. | |
| Flashpoints & The Korean Peninsula Threat | 4 | 6 | 2 | 1 | Host introduces North Korea as a potential catalyst for conflict. Guest uses the 1914 assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand to illustrate how third-party flashpoints escalate into unwanted major wars. | |
| Clash of Civilizations & World Orders | 3 | 7 | 1 | 0 | Host relays an audience question contrasting Westphalian balance of power with Chinese world order. Guest educates the room on the Confucian hierarchical mindset and the concept of knowing one's place. | |
| Applied History & Council of Historical Advisors | 5 | 5 | 2 | 1 | Host demonstrates knowledge of guest's policy advocacy for a White House Council of Historical Advisors. Guest explains applied history as an engineering-like discipline facing resistance from academic purists. |
Statements from this episode (17)
Allison: 12 of 16 historical power transitions have resulted in war
“I find 16 cases in which a rising power threatened to displace a ruling power. In 12 of the cases, the outcome was war. In four of the cases, the outcome was not war.”
Allison: Maintaining current US-China policies will likely result in war
“Business as usual in the relationship between the US and China will likely produce history as usual.”
Allison: India will not displace the U.S. as Asia's dominant power
“No one imagines India is going to displace the U.S. As the predominant power in Asia.”
Allison: Measured by PPP, China is the world's largest economy
“International economies, and I believe the best yardstick is purchasing power parity, which is also the yardstick that CIA and IMF think is the best yardstick. By that yardstick, China is currently the largest economy in the world.”
Colford: American tech companies are increasingly copying Chinese platforms like WeChat
“You look at technologies like WeChat, and increasingly American, you're seeing American companies actually copy Chinese companies.”
Colford: Obama national security meetings rarely focused on Asia beyond Sony hack
“I think I can count on one hand the number of DCs and peace deputies committee meetings and principal committee meetings that I remember that were about Asia, and the majority of them were about the Sony hack in North Korea, at least when I was there.”
Allison: China is the primary trading partner and investor across Asia
“If you go around the ASEAN countries, or you go around Northeast Asia, the principal buyer, the principal seller, the principal investor is China.”
Allison: China uses trade leverage like banana imports to coerce foreign governments
“The Chinese Not only have economic power, but they exercise economic power. So when the Philippines behaves in a way they don't like, they say, I think your bananas that you're importing to China may be suspect. So they just leave them on the dock till they ro…”
Allison: Chinese development banks hold four times the capital of World Bank
“So now, for development loans, the Chinese development banks, if you take the group together, including AAAB, have four times the capital of the World Bank.”
Allison: U.S. and China are virtually in a cyber Cold War
“So basically, I would say, interestingly, we now virtually have a Cold War in cyber between the U.S. And China.”
Allison: Xi Jinping's platform is colloquially 'Make China Great Again'
“Four years before that, five years before that, Xi Jinping became president of China. And what does his banner say? If colloquially, make China great again.”
Allison: Xi maintains power by building competent government cadres
“He's trying to purify, as he puts it, to rectify the party, to make it virtuous. Again, how can you do this? We build some cadre, Who will be so competent in performing the functions of government that citizens will say, well, they're doing a good job, and, yo…”
Colford: Both China and the US share a sense of manifest destiny
“Both China and U.S. Have this sense of kind of manifest destiny”
Allison: US threatened war with Canada to acquire Alaskan territory
“And so we basically threatened war with Canada unless they gave us this territory, and we took it.”
Allison: North Korea conflict is today's most dangerous geopolitical flashpoint
“One of the most dangerous development in the, on the horizon today, what's happening on the North Korean peninsula, and why is it so dangerous? Because it's an element in this Thucydidean dynamic.”
Allison: Chinese conception of international order is based on hierarchical dominance
“Chinese, ah, conception of order is extremely different than American conceptions of order. In the Chinese conception of order, you have basically a hierarchical dominance. In which somebody's at the top of the pyramid, and everybody else is, is located in rel…”