Sep 11, 2024 · 1h 11m · news
David Schneider: Why the Worst VCs are "Seagull VCs" & VC Value Add - Is it Real? | E1200 · 20VC with Harry Stebbings
gold bands on the timeline = statements, start to end. Hover to read, click to jump. CC turns on captions
In this episode of 20VC, legendary operator-turned-venture-capitalist David Schneider joins Harry Stebbings to share tactical lessons from scaling Data Domain and ServiceNow. He explores enterprise sales strategies, the reality of venture board dynamics, the value of direct feedback, and how founders can build enduring, multi-product companies.
How this conversation actually went
Every chapter scored 0–10 on four independent dynamics. Hover any point for the reasoning behind the score. Harry holds 18.7% of the talking time here. How this is scored →
speaking balance: gold is Harry, purple is the guest (3 minute bins)
David directly opposes Harry's assertion that young people do not want to work or sacrifice like previous generations.
Hardest push from Harry ▶ 54:21 Harry presses David on accepting small deal allocationsHarry forcefully challenges David for accepting small check allocations rather than walking away, stating that he himself has zero time for small positions.
Biggest teaching moment ▶ 36:09 Dismantling Customer Success teamsDavid systematically breaks down why Customer Success is a make-believe organization that disguises deficiencies in sales, support, and professional services.
Harry holds his own ▶ 38:52 Challenging Singerman's view on VC value addHarry brings a strong quote from Brian Singerman asserting top founders do not need VC help, forcing David to defend his entire operator-investor premise.
the scores for every segment, with the reasoning behind each
| Chapter | Topic | Harry as informed peer | Guest teaching | Guest disagreement | Harry pushing back | Why |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Welcoming David Schneider and His Operating Career | 3 | 4 | 0 | 0 | Harry welcomes David and asks standard interview questions regarding his career achievements and the hostile acquisition of Data Domain. David warmly describes his background and tells the story of EMC outbidding NetApp. | |
| Key Lessons on Product-Market Fit and Value | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | Harry brings up budget line items, asking whether new software adds or replaces line items. David reframes this around his framework that enterprise software is bought to make money, save money, or stay off the front page. | |
| Combating Deal Slippage with Clear Value Frameworks | 3 | 4 | 0 | 0 | Harry shares an observation about deal slippage from board meetings. David explains ServiceNow's value prompter methodology and how CROs must forecast revenue within three percent. | |
| Disrupting the Market: Defeating Stagnant Competitors | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | Harry discusses his dislike of competition when investing and asks about ideal sales reps. David explains taking market share from stagnant incumbents like BMC and HP while hiring reps with a chip on their shoulder. | |
| Reversing the Pyramid with Bottom-Up Innovation | 3 | 4 | 2 | 1 | Harry asks about executive transparency and bottom-up innovation. David gently rejects top-down models, illustrating how an SE's customer feedback led to ServiceNow's billion-dollar HR product. | |
| Scaling ServiceNow and the Legacy of Fred Luddy | 5 | 3 | 0 | 2 | Harry demonstrates high preparation by citing feedback from twelve mutual contacts regarding David's decision speed. David reflects on Fred Luddy's customer focus and the operational challenge of fixing the plane while flying it. | |
| Internal Promotion, Mentorship, and Retaining Executive Talent | 4 | 5 | 6 | 4 | Harry asserts that young people no longer want to work hard or sacrifice. David forcefully disagrees, defending young talent and offering an artwork analogy to describe the sales leader's role in elevating founder engineering. | |
| ServiceNow's Aggressive Sales Ramp and Pricing Overhaul | 3 | 5 | 0 | 1 | Harry inquires about the mechanics of scaling ServiceNow from eighty million to five billion. David explains ramping sales capacity by hiring 150 reps in 90 days, doubling prices, and overcoming Gartner's market size caps. | |
| Market Timing, referencing, and the Discovery Process | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | Harry shares his perspective on the importance of comfortable silence during interviews. David outlines how sales discovery techniques enhance venture investment diligence. | |
| Exiting Down-Market: The ServiceNow Express Mistake | 4 | 5 | 0 | 0 | Harry shares advice he gives founders on premature customer segment expansion. David details the failure of ServiceNow Express and how focusing exclusively on enterprise allowed them to build multiple hundred-million dollar products. | |
| The Operational Case Against Customer Success Teams | 5 | 6 | 4 | 3 | Harry references Snowflake's Chris Degnan in calling Customer Success teams 'bullshit'. David agrees, calling CS a 'make-believe organization' whose responsibilities belong in sales, support, and professional services. | |
| Founder Helpful VC and Transitioning to Venture | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | Harry cites Founders Fund's Brian Singerman's view that the best founders do not need VC help. David counters sharply, arguing that VCs who say this simply do not know how to help, while distinguishing between founder friendly and founder helpful. | |
| Mitigating Series B/C Risks and Preventing Plateaus | 5 | 5 | 2 | 3 | Harry references Greylock's Sam on compressed Series B/C returns and asks why growth plateaus. David explains how customer profiles, NRR, and unproven renewal cycles drive growth slowdowns. | |
| Stagnant Startups & the Need for a Second Act | 4 | 4 | 2 | 3 | Harry posits that ten-billion-dollar companies require a founder who can navigate multiple acts, clarifying the difference between valuation and revenue. David explains how post-2021 startups are navigating excess cash and valuations. | |
| Winning Competitive Deals & Board Seat Selection | 4 | 4 | 2 | 3 | Harry presses David on target ownership percentages and return hurdles. David explains Coatue's growth underwriting strategy and check sizing, highlighting a co-investment with Karl Eschenbach. | |
| Concentration & Continuous Participation Across Funding Rounds | 5 | 4 | 2 | 2 | Harry asserts that investors know whether an investment is good within three to six months and references Jason Lemkin's view on feedback. David agrees that underlying issues emerge quickly post-investment. | |
| Walking Away Over Valuation & Managing Small Allocations | 6 | 6 | 3 | 5 | Harry challenges David for taking small fund allocations instead of declining them outright, citing Vinod Khosla's view on VCs. David coin's the term 'Seagull VCs' and outlines his three red / three green board framework. | |
| The Best Board Members: Lessons from Doug Leone, Mike Volpe, and Anil Bhusri | 5 | 5 | 4 | 3 | Harry asks for David's favorite board members and asks how pattern matching applies when comparing veteran CEOs to young founders. David reframes this by comparing current founders to Frank Slootman's early days at Data Domain. | |
| The Coatue Edge: Why David Schneider Joined the Firm | 5 | 4 | 2 | 4 | Harry starts a quick-fire round and pushes back against 'shit sandwich' feedback. David details why he joined Coatue and emphasizes the value of employee windshield time on business trips. | |
| David's Greatest Operational Correction & Frank Slootman's Brutal Feedback | 3 | 6 | 0 | 0 | Harry asks about Frank Slootman's temper. David shares a story from Data Domain where Slootman threatened to fire him over an aggressive email to engineering, teaching him an invaluable lesson in operational culture. | |
| Bill McDermott's Sales Mastery & Enterprise Relationship Building | 3 | 4 | 0 | 0 | Harry asks about Bill McDermott's sales strengths and David's personal motivations. David praises McDermott's enterprise network and reflects on his own fear of failure driving continuous improvement. |