Apr 9, 2018 · 58m · capital-allocators

Chris Brockmeyer – On Broadway (Capital Allocators, EP.47)

Chris Brockmeyer · 42m spoken Ted Seides · 12m spoken
0:00 / 0:00

gold bands on the timeline = statements, start to end. Hover to read, click to jump. CC turns on captions

In this episode of Capital Allocators, host Ted Seides interviews Chris Brockmeyer, Director of Employee Benefit Funds for the Broadway League, exploring the governance complexities, asset allocation shifts, and operational transitions of managing $7 billion across multi-employer Taft-Hartley pension and benefit plans. Brockmeyer details how labor-management dynamics, philosophical principles, and the strategic shift toward Outsource CIO (OCIO) models drive long-term fiduciary success in commercial theatre retirement funds.

How this conversation actually went

Every chapter scored 0–10 on four independent dynamics. Hover any point for the reasoning behind the score. Ted holds 23.2% of the talking time here. How this is scored →

Ted as informed peer 4.7 Guest teaching 3.9 Guest disagreement 1.3 Ted pushing back 2.5
05100:0015:0030:0045:005:40–9:18 · Ted as informed peer 3/10 From Philosophy to Labor Relations on Broadway Ted opens with conversational questions about Brockmeyer's transition from philosophy to Broadway labor relations. Brockmeyer explains how negotiation and debate skills translated naturally to representing unions and management.9:18–13:58 · Ted as informed peer 4/10 The Structure of Broadway League Multi-Employer Plans Ted asks structural questions about the 13 distinct boards and 21 plans. Brockmeyer details the multi-employer Taft-Hartley framework and why historical pride prevents broader plan mergers.13:58–20:20 · Ted as informed peer 5/10 Governance Hurdles and Decision-Making Lag in Pensions Ted pushes on the lack of investment professionals among trustees, asking what choice they have but to follow consultants. Brockmeyer explains the painful lag of governance, such as taking over two years to allocate to private equity.20:21–23:59 · Ted as informed peer 4/10 Evolution of Asset Allocation and Diversification Post-2008 Brockmeyer educates Ted on the unique political restrictions of pre-2008 Taft-Hartley plans, including resistance to non-US investments. The 2008 crisis forced boards into broader asset diversification like private equity and credit.23:59–28:23 · Ted as informed peer 4/10 Navigating Investment Consultants and Trustee Board Dynamics Ted prompts Brockmeyer for concrete examples of consultant breakdowns. Brockmeyer outlines an instance where perceived favoritism between union and management trustees poisoned trust during a private equity search.28:23–30:50 · Ted as informed peer 5/10 Pension Liabilities, LDI Infeasibility, and Return Assumptions Ted probes the tension between funding levels and risk-taking. Brockmeyer explains why Liability-Driven Investing (LDI) is politically impossible in Taft-Hartley plans because it caps future benefit growth.30:50–35:48 · Ted as informed peer 5/10 Sponsor Spotlight: Ridgeline Investment Management Technology After the sponsor break, Ted challenges whether actuarial return assumptions of 7.5% remain realistic given market valuations. Brockmeyer explains the shift toward separating 5-10 year capital market assumptions from 30-year horizons.35:48–40:04 · Ted as informed peer 5/10 Consultant Effectiveness, Market Patience, and Hegelian Dialectics Ted sharpens the conversation by asking if sitting through the 2008 drawdown was wisdom or just governance paralysis. Brockmeyer defends the board's patience while acknowledging the lag, bringing in Hegelian dialectics as a negotiation philosophy.40:04–47:33 · Ted as informed peer 6/10 Transitioning Multi-Employer Plans to an OCIO Model Ted questions whether OCIO models justify their higher fees through alpha or merely by circumventing human behavioral mistakes. Brockmeyer explains their recent adoption of an OCIO model and illustrates the rare value of rapid governance via the TARP program.47:34–53:31 · Ted as informed peer 6/10 Comparing Pension Governance and Investment Manager Selection Ted presses on capacity constraints, challenging whether scaled OCIOs inevitably dilute performance toward the average. Brockmeyer notes that their new OCIO replaced 29 of 30 existing managers with non-traditional Taft-Hartley rosters.5:40–9:18 · Guest teaching 2/10 From Philosophy to Labor Relations on Broadway Ted opens with conversational questions about Brockmeyer's transition from philosophy to Broadway labor relations. Brockmeyer explains how negotiation and debate skills translated naturally to representing unions and management.9:18–13:58 · Guest teaching 4/10 The Structure of Broadway League Multi-Employer Plans Ted asks structural questions about the 13 distinct boards and 21 plans. Brockmeyer details the multi-employer Taft-Hartley framework and why historical pride prevents broader plan mergers.13:58–20:20 · Guest teaching 4/10 Governance Hurdles and Decision-Making Lag in Pensions Ted pushes on the lack of investment professionals among trustees, asking what choice they have but to follow consultants. Brockmeyer explains the painful lag of governance, such as taking over two years to allocate to private equity.20:21–23:59 · Guest teaching 5/10 Evolution of Asset Allocation and Diversification Post-2008 Brockmeyer educates Ted on the unique political restrictions of pre-2008 Taft-Hartley plans, including resistance to non-US investments. The 2008 crisis forced boards into broader asset diversification like private equity and credit.23:59–28:23 · Guest teaching 4/10 Navigating Investment Consultants and Trustee Board Dynamics Ted prompts Brockmeyer for concrete examples of consultant breakdowns. Brockmeyer outlines an instance where perceived favoritism between union and management trustees poisoned trust during a private equity search.28:23–30:50 · Guest teaching 5/10 Pension Liabilities, LDI Infeasibility, and Return Assumptions Ted probes the tension between funding levels and risk-taking. Brockmeyer explains why Liability-Driven Investing (LDI) is politically impossible in Taft-Hartley plans because it caps future benefit growth.30:50–35:48 · Guest teaching 4/10 Sponsor Spotlight: Ridgeline Investment Management Technology After the sponsor break, Ted challenges whether actuarial return assumptions of 7.5% remain realistic given market valuations. Brockmeyer explains the shift toward separating 5-10 year capital market assumptions from 30-year horizons.35:48–40:04 · Guest teaching 3/10 Consultant Effectiveness, Market Patience, and Hegelian Dialectics Ted sharpens the conversation by asking if sitting through the 2008 drawdown was wisdom or just governance paralysis. Brockmeyer defends the board's patience while acknowledging the lag, bringing in Hegelian dialectics as a negotiation philosophy.40:04–47:33 · Guest teaching 4/10 Transitioning Multi-Employer Plans to an OCIO Model Ted questions whether OCIO models justify their higher fees through alpha or merely by circumventing human behavioral mistakes. Brockmeyer explains their recent adoption of an OCIO model and illustrates the rare value of rapid governance via the TARP program.47:34–53:31 · Guest teaching 4/10 Comparing Pension Governance and Investment Manager Selection Ted presses on capacity constraints, challenging whether scaled OCIOs inevitably dilute performance toward the average. Brockmeyer notes that their new OCIO replaced 29 of 30 existing managers with non-traditional Taft-Hartley rosters.5:40–9:18 · Guest disagreement 1/10 From Philosophy to Labor Relations on Broadway Ted opens with conversational questions about Brockmeyer's transition from philosophy to Broadway labor relations. Brockmeyer explains how negotiation and debate skills translated naturally to representing unions and management.9:18–13:58 · Guest disagreement 1/10 The Structure of Broadway League Multi-Employer Plans Ted asks structural questions about the 13 distinct boards and 21 plans. Brockmeyer details the multi-employer Taft-Hartley framework and why historical pride prevents broader plan mergers.13:58–20:20 · Guest disagreement 2/10 Governance Hurdles and Decision-Making Lag in Pensions Ted pushes on the lack of investment professionals among trustees, asking what choice they have but to follow consultants. Brockmeyer explains the painful lag of governance, such as taking over two years to allocate to private equity.20:21–23:59 · Guest disagreement 2/10 Evolution of Asset Allocation and Diversification Post-2008 Brockmeyer educates Ted on the unique political restrictions of pre-2008 Taft-Hartley plans, including resistance to non-US investments. The 2008 crisis forced boards into broader asset diversification like private equity and credit.23:59–28:23 · Guest disagreement 1/10 Navigating Investment Consultants and Trustee Board Dynamics Ted prompts Brockmeyer for concrete examples of consultant breakdowns. Brockmeyer outlines an instance where perceived favoritism between union and management trustees poisoned trust during a private equity search.28:23–30:50 · Guest disagreement 1/10 Pension Liabilities, LDI Infeasibility, and Return Assumptions Ted probes the tension between funding levels and risk-taking. Brockmeyer explains why Liability-Driven Investing (LDI) is politically impossible in Taft-Hartley plans because it caps future benefit growth.30:50–35:48 · Guest disagreement 1/10 Sponsor Spotlight: Ridgeline Investment Management Technology After the sponsor break, Ted challenges whether actuarial return assumptions of 7.5% remain realistic given market valuations. Brockmeyer explains the shift toward separating 5-10 year capital market assumptions from 30-year horizons.35:48–40:04 · Guest disagreement 2/10 Consultant Effectiveness, Market Patience, and Hegelian Dialectics Ted sharpens the conversation by asking if sitting through the 2008 drawdown was wisdom or just governance paralysis. Brockmeyer defends the board's patience while acknowledging the lag, bringing in Hegelian dialectics as a negotiation philosophy.40:04–47:33 · Guest disagreement 1/10 Transitioning Multi-Employer Plans to an OCIO Model Ted questions whether OCIO models justify their higher fees through alpha or merely by circumventing human behavioral mistakes. Brockmeyer explains their recent adoption of an OCIO model and illustrates the rare value of rapid governance via the TARP program.47:34–53:31 · Guest disagreement 1/10 Comparing Pension Governance and Investment Manager Selection Ted presses on capacity constraints, challenging whether scaled OCIOs inevitably dilute performance toward the average. Brockmeyer notes that their new OCIO replaced 29 of 30 existing managers with non-traditional Taft-Hartley rosters.5:40–9:18 · Ted pushing back 1/10 From Philosophy to Labor Relations on Broadway Ted opens with conversational questions about Brockmeyer's transition from philosophy to Broadway labor relations. Brockmeyer explains how negotiation and debate skills translated naturally to representing unions and management.9:18–13:58 · Ted pushing back 1/10 The Structure of Broadway League Multi-Employer Plans Ted asks structural questions about the 13 distinct boards and 21 plans. Brockmeyer details the multi-employer Taft-Hartley framework and why historical pride prevents broader plan mergers.13:58–20:20 · Ted pushing back 3/10 Governance Hurdles and Decision-Making Lag in Pensions Ted pushes on the lack of investment professionals among trustees, asking what choice they have but to follow consultants. Brockmeyer explains the painful lag of governance, such as taking over two years to allocate to private equity.20:21–23:59 · Ted pushing back 2/10 Evolution of Asset Allocation and Diversification Post-2008 Brockmeyer educates Ted on the unique political restrictions of pre-2008 Taft-Hartley plans, including resistance to non-US investments. The 2008 crisis forced boards into broader asset diversification like private equity and credit.23:59–28:23 · Ted pushing back 2/10 Navigating Investment Consultants and Trustee Board Dynamics Ted prompts Brockmeyer for concrete examples of consultant breakdowns. Brockmeyer outlines an instance where perceived favoritism between union and management trustees poisoned trust during a private equity search.28:23–30:50 · Ted pushing back 2/10 Pension Liabilities, LDI Infeasibility, and Return Assumptions Ted probes the tension between funding levels and risk-taking. Brockmeyer explains why Liability-Driven Investing (LDI) is politically impossible in Taft-Hartley plans because it caps future benefit growth.30:50–35:48 · Ted pushing back 3/10 Sponsor Spotlight: Ridgeline Investment Management Technology After the sponsor break, Ted challenges whether actuarial return assumptions of 7.5% remain realistic given market valuations. Brockmeyer explains the shift toward separating 5-10 year capital market assumptions from 30-year horizons.35:48–40:04 · Ted pushing back 4/10 Consultant Effectiveness, Market Patience, and Hegelian Dialectics Ted sharpens the conversation by asking if sitting through the 2008 drawdown was wisdom or just governance paralysis. Brockmeyer defends the board's patience while acknowledging the lag, bringing in Hegelian dialectics as a negotiation philosophy.40:04–47:33 · Ted pushing back 3/10 Transitioning Multi-Employer Plans to an OCIO Model Ted questions whether OCIO models justify their higher fees through alpha or merely by circumventing human behavioral mistakes. Brockmeyer explains their recent adoption of an OCIO model and illustrates the rare value of rapid governance via the TARP program.47:34–53:31 · Ted pushing back 4/10 Comparing Pension Governance and Investment Manager Selection Ted presses on capacity constraints, challenging whether scaled OCIOs inevitably dilute performance toward the average. Brockmeyer notes that their new OCIO replaced 29 of 30 existing managers with non-traditional Taft-Hartley rosters.

speaking balance: gold is Ted, purple is the guest (3 minute bins)

0:00 · Ted 100% · guest 0%0:00 · Ted 100% · guest 0%3:00 · Ted 98.8% · guest 1.2%3:00 · Ted 98.8% · guest 1.2%6:00 · Ted 4.4% · guest 95.6%6:00 · Ted 4.4% · guest 95.6%9:00 · Ted 18.9% · guest 81.1%9:00 · Ted 18.9% · guest 81.1%12:00 · Ted 12.5% · guest 87.5%12:00 · Ted 12.5% · guest 87.5%15:00 · Ted 13.8% · guest 86.2%15:00 · Ted 13.8% · guest 86.2%18:00 · Ted 2.8% · guest 97.2%18:00 · Ted 2.8% · guest 97.2%21:00 · Ted 1.1% · guest 98.9%21:00 · Ted 1.1% · guest 98.9%24:00 · Ted 10.7% · guest 89.3%24:00 · Ted 10.7% · guest 89.3%27:00 · Ted 11.9% · guest 88.1%27:00 · Ted 11.9% · guest 88.1%30:00 · Ted 38.8% · guest 61.2%30:00 · Ted 38.8% · guest 61.2%33:00 · Ted 16.1% · guest 83.9%33:00 · Ted 16.1% · guest 83.9%36:00 · Ted 13.2% · guest 86.8%36:00 · Ted 13.2% · guest 86.8%39:00 · Ted 18.9% · guest 81.1%39:00 · Ted 18.9% · guest 81.1%42:00 · Ted 6.9% · guest 93.1%42:00 · Ted 6.9% · guest 93.1%45:00 · Ted 20% · guest 80%45:00 · Ted 20% · guest 80%48:00 · Ted 3.1% · guest 96.9%48:00 · Ted 3.1% · guest 96.9%51:00 · Ted 25.6% · guest 74.4%51:00 · Ted 25.6% · guest 74.4%54:00 · Ted 16% · guest 84%54:00 · Ted 16% · guest 84%57:00 · Ted 36% · guest 64%57:00 · Ted 36% · guest 64%
Sharpest disagreement ▶ 38:12 Brockmeyer rejects framing of governance paralysis

Brockmeyer pushes back against Ted's suggestion that holding through 2008 was purely an accidental byproduct of slow decision-making rather than conscious fortitude.

Hardest push from Ted ▶ 51:04 Ted pushes back on OCIO best-of-breed claims

Ted directly challenges the assumption that scaling consultants can deliver superior alpha, pointing out that by definition, scaled OCIOs cannot give everyone best-in-breed managers.

Biggest teaching moment ▶ 21:21 Brockmeyer explains union bans on international equity

Brockmeyer reveals to Ted that historical Taft-Hartley restrictions avoided international developed equities because unions objected to funding non-American labor competitors.

Ted holds their own ▶ 33:37 Ted challenges 7.5 percent return assumptions against market realities

Ted leverages market expertise regarding compressed bond yields and high equity valuations to challenge whether boards understand the difficulty of achieving target returns.

the scores for every segment, with the reasoning behind each
ChapterTopicTed as informed peerGuest teachingGuest disagreementTed pushing backWhy
From Philosophy to Labor Relations on Broadway 3211 Ted opens with conversational questions about Brockmeyer's transition from philosophy to Broadway labor relations. Brockmeyer explains how negotiation and debate skills translated naturally to representing unions and management.
The Structure of Broadway League Multi-Employer Plans 4411 Ted asks structural questions about the 13 distinct boards and 21 plans. Brockmeyer details the multi-employer Taft-Hartley framework and why historical pride prevents broader plan mergers.
Governance Hurdles and Decision-Making Lag in Pensions 5423 Ted pushes on the lack of investment professionals among trustees, asking what choice they have but to follow consultants. Brockmeyer explains the painful lag of governance, such as taking over two years to allocate to private equity.
Evolution of Asset Allocation and Diversification Post-2008 4522 Brockmeyer educates Ted on the unique political restrictions of pre-2008 Taft-Hartley plans, including resistance to non-US investments. The 2008 crisis forced boards into broader asset diversification like private equity and credit.
Navigating Investment Consultants and Trustee Board Dynamics 4412 Ted prompts Brockmeyer for concrete examples of consultant breakdowns. Brockmeyer outlines an instance where perceived favoritism between union and management trustees poisoned trust during a private equity search.
Pension Liabilities, LDI Infeasibility, and Return Assumptions 5512 Ted probes the tension between funding levels and risk-taking. Brockmeyer explains why Liability-Driven Investing (LDI) is politically impossible in Taft-Hartley plans because it caps future benefit growth.
Sponsor Spotlight: Ridgeline Investment Management Technology 5413 After the sponsor break, Ted challenges whether actuarial return assumptions of 7.5% remain realistic given market valuations. Brockmeyer explains the shift toward separating 5-10 year capital market assumptions from 30-year horizons.
Consultant Effectiveness, Market Patience, and Hegelian Dialectics 5324 Ted sharpens the conversation by asking if sitting through the 2008 drawdown was wisdom or just governance paralysis. Brockmeyer defends the board's patience while acknowledging the lag, bringing in Hegelian dialectics as a negotiation philosophy.
Transitioning Multi-Employer Plans to an OCIO Model 6413 Ted questions whether OCIO models justify their higher fees through alpha or merely by circumventing human behavioral mistakes. Brockmeyer explains their recent adoption of an OCIO model and illustrates the rare value of rapid governance via the TARP program.
Comparing Pension Governance and Investment Manager Selection 6414 Ted presses on capacity constraints, challenging whether scaled OCIOs inevitably dilute performance toward the average. Brockmeyer notes that their new OCIO replaced 29 of 30 existing managers with non-traditional Taft-Hartley rosters.

Statements from this episode (13)

Assertion Partly supported
Broadway League merged its union health plans from 11 to five
“When I started this job a little over 10 years ago, I believe there were 10, maybe 11 health plans, and now there are five. So there have been mergers, substantial, significant mergers on the health fund side.”
Chris Brockmeyer Apr 9, 2018 ▶ 12:31
Assertion Not checkable as stated
Pension governance lag delayed private equity deployment by over two years
“And by the end of the process, it took us north of two years to actually go from the idea of investing in private equity to actually engaging the manager. And then of course, it takes years to actually fund private equity. So, you know, as a result, we missed …”
Chris Brockmeyer Apr 9, 2018 ▶ 19:30
Assertion Supported
Pre-2008 Taft-Hartley pension plans avoided private equity and foreign equities
“Well, before 2008, 2009 financial crisis, you would be hard pressed to find a Taft-Hartley plan invested in private equity invested in emerging markets. It just didn't exist. In fact, in some industries, you would not even see plans invested in developed inter…”
Chris Brockmeyer Apr 9, 2018 ▶ 21:21
Disclosure
Broadway League fired investment consultant after trust eroded during PE process
“Once we finally got to the point where we had gotten the education, the RFP process and the discussions that went on between the consultant, the union trustees and the employer trustees created an environment where one side wasn't trusting the other side. And …”
Chris Brockmeyer Apr 9, 2018 ▶ 25:18
Insight
Well-funded pension plans reliably trigger union-employer friction over benefit payouts
“The most obvious time where it does is When the union, you know, a plan is really well funded, the union trustees come in and say, we want to increase benefits. Inevitably, the increase being sought will make the employer trustees uncomfortable, and so even if…”
Chris Brockmeyer Apr 9, 2018 ▶ 27:02
Insight
Why LDI strategies fail in Taft-Hartley multi-employer pension funds
“LDI strategies don't work in Taft-Hartley for a lot of different reasons, but one of which, one major, I would say, political reason is that once you adopt an LDI type strategy, you are basically saying, These are my liabilities. They're not going to change. A…”
Chris Brockmeyer Apr 9, 2018 ▶ 28:39
Disclosure
Broadway League funds use internal 7% return targets for conservatism
“A number of funds I sit on, we've established what we consider sort of an internal assumption that we, notwithstanding whatever the actuary certifies with the federal government, will say, You know, we want to use a seven percent return assumption because we w…”
Chris Brockmeyer Apr 9, 2018 ▶ 29:35
Disclosure
One Broadway pension plan allocates 20% to PE, 15% to EM
“I have one plan in particular that the board has decided it needs to try to Really maximize returns and shoot for an eight plus percent return profile. And that means that we have, you know, 20% invested in private equity and 15% in emerging markets.”
Chris Brockmeyer Apr 9, 2018 ▶ 32:12
Assertion Supported
No Broadway League pension plans exited equities during 2008 financial crisis
“And the 2008, 2009 financial crisis taught us that we should not act based on alarming data, alarming information, and none of the plans I sit on exited equities at any point in time. We just sat there and Bore it out, and we were rewarded in the end because w…”
Chris Brockmeyer Apr 9, 2018 ▶ 37:38
Assertion Supported
OCIO models can be four to six times costlier than consultants
“Relative to the traditional consultants, an OCIO could be four, five, six times more expensive”
Chris Brockmeyer Apr 9, 2018 ▶ 41:09
Assertion Not checkable as stated
TARP proved hugely rewarding for the one Broadway pension that invested
“When we had the TARP program came about only one plan I sit on took advantage of TARP and it was, as we all know, is hugely, hugely successful and rewarding for those of us that got into it.”
Chris Brockmeyer Apr 9, 2018 ▶ 43:00
Disclosure
Broadway League funds represent $7 billion in pension and annuity assets
“We represent about seven billion dollars in our pension and annuity plans combined.”
Chris Brockmeyer Apr 9, 2018 ▶ 47:47
Disclosure
New OCIO fired 29 of 30 incumbent managers on Broadway plan
“When we went to an OCIO that had not had any Taft-Hartley experience before, the termination of existing managers and replacement was astonishing. I think there was maybe one manager out of 30 that they kept. Of the existing group.”
Chris Brockmeyer Apr 9, 2018 ▶ 51:49
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