The Exchanges

Q And let's start with that. What's the thesis around reserve allocation?

A Boy, if there's anything I've gotten wrong over the years, it's this. When I started, when I, when I built the very first spreadsheet model of what would Harrison Metal Capital One look like, reserves was the big unknown to me, because you have to make a range of assumptions. You have to make assumptions about the mortality rate. You have to be cognizant of what the premature M&A exits look like. You have to be cognizant of What's going to happen in the A and the B market two years or more after you make the initial investment. It's full of guesses basically. And so initially what I did was I used to reserve one dollar of reserve money for every, for every dollar primary money. And so when I made an investment, I would basically just sort of park the same amount of money in my reserve account. Now that reserve account is allocated very unequally. So we don't park the money in the name of that company. We park the money in the name of general reserves. And so I Fund the reserves separate from the decision about who gets the money. Over time, the way I've funded the reserves pool is varied between taking that ratio all the way up to two to one, back down to now I reserve about a buck 50 for every initial dollar. I'm confident that each of those guesses is wrong, but I don't know for several years how wrong is it.

AI assessment note: “now I reserve about a buck 50 for every initial dollar.”

Q In terms of kind of another core tenant, recycling is one that's always very interesting for me, especially with kind of smaller fund sizes, and as you said, not the resources of Peter Fenton. Uh, so with a fund size like Harrison Metal, how do you think about recycling and really kind of optimizing every dollar?

A Well, we've done a little bit of it over the years, but it's really not a core part of the strategy. And, you know, I've talked to people who feel very differently and who run terrifically profitable businesses and who believe very strongly that recycling is an important part of the strategy. I mean, if I did it, it was in the case, it was in a, just a handful of cases where, you know, we were slightly off on reserves. I don't consider it a bulk part of the strategy because let's be honest, my numbers call it On a fund are driven by my initial investment picking. So picking is the primary thing I do. If I pick really well, I should generate great multiples and, and liquidity for my investors. I just sort of have an operating principle that I want that liquidity back in their hands as quickly as possible. When you stop and think about the mission of these organizations, universities, museums, scientific research foundations, getting that cash back to them is incredibly important. So I tend not to try to hold back liquidity once I get it.

AI assessment note: “we've done a little bit of it over the years, but it's really not a core part of the strategy.”

Q If we expand that kind of assessment to the wider management team, how do you assess the quality of the management team as a broader spectrum, not just the founder? Is there a process So you've developed behind it.

A Yeah, I'm sort of a disciple of this fellow named Daniel McCallum, who was an executive in the railroads in the mid-eighteen hundreds. Uh, Daniel's story was he was promoted up from within the railroad, from the inside the New York and Erie railroad, which was a huge high growth company of its day. He was promoted up from individual carpenter to bridge builder to superintendent of bridges, and then up through the ranks of general management until he found himself very quickly at the top Essentially what would today be called the CEO of the railroad. And he wrote this treatise on general management, which I still use to this day in teaching the general management class that I do at Harrison Metal. His philosophy boiled down to a handful of things. He said, look, the general manager has to get everybody aligned behind the right projects, the right investments. Second, make sure that the responsibility and authority is allocated appropriately. Third, measure how things are going along the way. Fourth, stop and make corrections if things are going badly. Fifth, do all of this with humanity and respect for other people. Now, the way he phrased humanity and respect for other people was in a very 19th century way. It was don't embarrass people who are senior, et cetera. But I, you know, I sort of round that up to treat other people the way they deserve to be treated. So that checklist…

AI assessment note: “I could take that checklist into any company. I could talk To a handful”

Q I know, exactly the same as me. I remember I had a lightning bolt moment with that one. Towards me, favorite blog or newsletter? What are your must reads? Rainy Day, what does Michael sit down to?

A Rainy Day, I read a lot of economic history. And so I follow this gaggle of economic historians on Twitter, and one of my favorite is this guy named Anton Howes. Anton is an historian who was, uh, at Brown, my alma mater. He's way younger than me, so he just finished his PhD, I think, not that long ago. Anyway, he and I met on Twitter, and he runs this fantastic daily invention quiz where he puts up an invention from the 17 or 1800 and, you know, part of the Industrial Revolution. It puts up an invention, picture of an invention, and asks people to guess based on the design of, and look and feel of it, what it was for, and it's a fun little contest, and I love following along with that.

AI assessment note: “one of my favorite is this guy named Anton Howes.”

Q And let's start with that. What's the thesis around reserve allocation?

A Boy, if there's anything I've gotten wrong over the years, it's this. When I started, when I, when I built the very first spreadsheet model of what would Harrison Metal Capital One look like, reserves was the big unknown to me, because you have to make a range of assumptions. You have to make assumptions about the mortality rate. You have to be cognizant of what the premature M&A exits look like. You have to be cognizant of What's going to happen in the A and the B market two years or more after you make the initial investment. It's full of guesses basically. And so initially what I did was I used to reserve one dollar of reserve money for every, for every dollar primary money. And so when I made an investment, I would basically just sort of park the same amount of money in my reserve account. Now that reserve account is allocated very unequally. So we don't park the money in the name of that company. We park the money in the name of general reserves. And so I Fund the reserves separate from the decision about who gets the money. Over time, the way I've funded the reserves pool is varied between taking that ratio all the way up to two to one, back down to now I reserve about a buck 50 for every initial dollar. I'm confident that each of those guesses is wrong, but I don't know for several years how wrong is it.

AI assessment note: “now I reserve about a buck 50 for every initial dollar.”

Q Why are markets better at capital allocators than CEOs?

A Oh, mostly because of the pricing system that's inherent in the market. So one of the biggest problems with internal capital allocation inside a company is, Very rarely do CEOs have access to true opportunity cost-based prices. And the market's really good at that. The market's really good at saying, well, if you're going to use my fill in the blank labor technology, physical asset to build your thing, you got to pay me for the next best use of that asset. What I could be making from someone else that doesn't happen inside companies very efficiently. And so when people are confronted with those very clear, crisp pricing signals, they're able to make way smarter choices about what to buy and what not to buy.

AI assessment note: “mostly because of the pricing system that's inherent in the market”

Q discussed by VCs on the show, being it's all about the team. You've said to me before, though, that bad management and leadership kills more startups than bad products. So starting on the founder, before we move to the team, you said that founders need to have a sense of personal exceptionalism. How do you look to think about this first, and then distinguish between potential brilliance and potential arrogance?

A Yeah, that's a, it's a hard one. I think my radar for personal exceptionalism has evolved over time, but I think the constant is, I'm looking for people who have broken out of the bounds of normal for their peer group. Now, that does not mean in business, that does not even mean as technicians or technical talent. It just means that whatever the circumstances were of their lives, that that Was not the determining factor. They were able to break out either because they took some crazy personal risk. They took some very sharp left-hand turn. They ended up accomplishing more and seeing more and building a much better experience base because of that risk-taking. So that personal exceptionalism, that sense that they are special, that they are destined for really unique outcomes relative to their peer group, I think that shows up early in somebody's life. And it's independent, quite independent of pedigree or brand name work experience. In fact, sometimes those things are negatively correlated, but the distinction you make between arrogance and personal exceptionalism is an important one. Personal exceptionalism just means that they see themselves as special and that their outcomes are going to be outside the bounds of normal. I think that they, a lot of times are some of the most self-critical people I know, and they beat themselves up When they do miss a goal or they fail in a vent…

AI assessment note: “the arrogance piece, I think, is easy to suss out. You see it in”

Q Going back to the core statement, though, that, uh, bad leadership can kill companies easier than bad products. We recently had, uh, Mike Dauber at Amplify Partners on the show, and he said that timing killed more startups I'm intrigued. Would you agree with this statement as a mortality kind of causation of startups?

A Well, I like the point, and I certainly have observed situations where timing was a huge handicap on an otherwise brilliant product or a brilliant team. I would say, though, that if you start with the premise that timing is always slightly wrong, I mean, listen, what are the odds that we invent something, we productize it, and we turn it into a company at exactly the right moment? It's practically impossible. So if timing is always a little bit off, It becomes a general management problem to figure out how to either accelerate the external conditions such that your product is a fit or pace your product investment so that you don't run out of money before the market becomes amenable to your product. And so, you know, listen, I'm a man with a hammer. I see a lot of nails. So I'm going to see every problem as a general management problem and a business leadership problem.

AI assessment note: “I'm going to see every problem as a general management problem and a business leadership problem.”

Q in terms of being able to lead rounds and ownership stakes. So if we're to take kind of three core tenets that I always feel are kind of quite crucial, I'd love to start with price sensitivity. Peter Fenton said on the show, never turn down a company based on valuation. It's a mental trap. How would you respond to that, and what would you evaluate as your price sensitivity-ness?

A Well, I'm tempted to say that if I had Peter Fenton's resources, I might feel exactly the same way. Uh, But, but I think where I come down on this is the message I see behind his comment or the assumption beneath that statement is that price is but one consideration and that you always have to manage your sensitivity to price against your conviction in the business and the team. And so the way I think about it is I try to stay away, put it mildly, stay away from situations where pricing expectations are totally out of whack with the opportunity and the team's level of progress so far. Look, I mean, pricing is the way that we manage our risk. It's the primary tool I have to manage my own risk in the situation. And so as my risk goes up, my price should go down and vice versa. And so I just try to keep a very disciplined view of, okay, given the level of progress they've made, given the level of potential outcomes here, what's a percentage ownership that I feel comfortable with? And what's the check size that feels right to go with that? And have a very honest conversation with the team about how my thinking evolved around each of those points. I would agree with Peter if what Peter means is that pricing is one consideration, and for those companies that you have strong conviction and you have evidence of terrific progress, you should be willing to pay up for those.

AI assessment note: “as my risk goes up, my price should go down and vice versa”

Q Where do you feel we are at now in terms of market timing and kind of pricing in the market itself?

A I think this is a multi-sided market, and this, this wasn't true 10 years ago. You know, 10 years ago, there was a handful of people doing institutionalized seed investing. There was a relatively small market for seed capital. Today, it's completely exploded, and there are hundreds of firms that are organized just like mine, and there, I mean, forget about the thousands of individual angels who are chasing convertible debt deals or these so-called safe notes. So I would say on the equity side of the market, I believe for the most part, companies are priced reasonably. That equity investors that I work with are very conscious of the kind of calculation I mentioned before. How much progress have they made? How much potential is there? And let's price that asset accordingly. On the convertible debt side of the market, I think it's terribly toxic and about as undisciplined as it could possibly be. I think there's a lot of factors behind that. The abundance of Capital among the angel community. I would say the tulip auction vibe that you get from some of these demo days. But I think overall, the market's got two sides to it. The equity side of the house, I think, is much more disciplined. The convertible debt side of the house is about as undisciplined as it could be.

AI assessment note: “on the equity side of the market, I believe for the most part, companies are priced reasonably.”

Q Why are markets better at capital allocators than CEOs?

A Oh, mostly because of the pricing system that's inherent in the market. So one of the biggest problems with internal capital allocation inside a company is, Very rarely do CEOs have access to true opportunity cost-based prices. And the market's really good at that. The market's really good at saying, well, if you're going to use my fill in the blank labor technology, physical asset to build your thing, you got to pay me for the next best use of that asset. What I could be making from someone else that doesn't happen inside companies very efficiently. And so when people are confronted with those very clear, crisp pricing signals, they're able to make way smarter choices about what to buy and what not to buy.

AI assessment note: “mostly because of the pricing system that's inherent in the market.”

Q discussed by VCs on the show, being it's all about the team. You've said to me before, though, that bad management and leadership kills more startups than bad products. So starting on the founder, before we move to the team, you said that founders need to have a sense of personal exceptionalism. How do you look to think about this first, and then distinguish between potential brilliance and potential arrogance?

A Yeah, that's a, it's a hard one. I think my radar for personal exceptionalism has evolved over time, but I think the constant is, I'm looking for people who have broken out of the bounds of normal for their peer group. Now, that does not mean in business, that does not even mean as technicians or technical talent. It just means that whatever the circumstances were of their lives, that that Was not the determining factor. They were able to break out either because they took some crazy personal risk. They took some very sharp left-hand turn. They ended up accomplishing more and seeing more and building a much better experience base because of that risk-taking. So that personal exceptionalism, that sense that they are special, that they are destined for really unique outcomes relative to their peer group, I think that shows up early in somebody's life. And it's independent, quite independent of pedigree or brand name work experience. In fact, sometimes those things are negatively correlated, but the distinction you make between arrogance and personal exceptionalism is an important one. Personal exceptionalism just means that they see themselves as special and that their outcomes are going to be outside the bounds of normal. I think that they, a lot of times are some of the most self-critical people I know, and they beat themselves up When they do miss a goal or they fail in a vent…

AI assessment note: “the distinction you make between arrogance and personal exceptionalism is an important one.”

Q Going back to the core statement, though, that, uh, bad leadership can kill companies easier than bad products. We recently had, uh, Mike Dauber at Amplify Partners on the show, and he said that timing killed more startups I'm intrigued. Would you agree with this statement as a mortality kind of causation of startups?

A Well, I like the point, and I certainly have observed situations where timing was a huge handicap on an otherwise brilliant product or a brilliant team. I would say, though, that if you start with the premise that timing is always slightly wrong, I mean, listen, what are the odds that we invent something, we productize it, and we turn it into a company at exactly the right moment? It's practically impossible. So if timing is always a little bit off, It becomes a general management problem to figure out how to either accelerate the external conditions such that your product is a fit or pace your product investment so that you don't run out of money before the market becomes amenable to your product. And so, you know, listen, I'm a man with a hammer. I see a lot of nails. So I'm going to see every problem as a general management problem and a business leadership problem.

AI assessment note: “It becomes a general management problem to figure out how to either accelerate the external conditions”

Q Where do you feel we are at now in terms of market timing and kind of pricing in the market itself?

A I think this is a multi-sided market, and this, this wasn't true 10 years ago. You know, 10 years ago, there was a handful of people doing institutionalized seed investing. There was a relatively small market for seed capital. Today, it's completely exploded, and there are hundreds of firms that are organized just like mine, and there, I mean, forget about the thousands of individual angels who are chasing convertible debt deals or these so-called safe notes. So I would say on the equity side of the market, I believe for the most part, companies are priced reasonably. That equity investors that I work with are very conscious of the kind of calculation I mentioned before. How much progress have they made? How much potential is there? And let's price that asset accordingly. On the convertible debt side of the market, I think it's terribly toxic and about as undisciplined as it could possibly be. I think there's a lot of factors behind that. The abundance of Capital among the angel community. I would say the tulip auction vibe that you get from some of these demo days. But I think overall, the market's got two sides to it. The equity side of the house, I think, is much more disciplined. The convertible debt side of the house is about as undisciplined as it could be.

AI assessment note: “on the equity side of the market, I believe for the most part, companies are priced reasonably”

Q In terms of the signaling function and potential negative signaling function, is it a case where you have to at least put some dollars into the companies that you initially go into?

A No, and I really straightforward Forward with the founders about that. I mean, I have reserves. They also understand that I don't have unlimited resources, and so I have to make decisions on the margin, and I have to say, is this the highest and best use of this one dollar? And just try to be transparent about that. I've rarely come into a situation where I've completely pulled out. I mean, it has happened, but usually for real values violations, you know, dishonesty, and thank God that's only happened, like, you know, two times out of more than a hundred cases. But yeah, so the reserve's Strategy for me is to treat it like, as you said, it's a fresh backing decision. Would I, if presented with this opportunity, make that investment today on behalf of my investors? And so, uh, try to treat it very much like a fresh decision.

AI assessment note: “No, and I really straightforward Forward with the founders about that.”

Q Absolutely. And another balance that I'd love to address is at the early stages, obviously, there's this kind of environment of iteration and testing. I'd love to hear how you assess the balance in founders between vision to carry on and pursue the mission, and then stubbornness to continue with something that's not working. How do you look to judge between the two?

A I think, you know, everybody walks around with these sort of, I'm a big fan of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, and you know, their big insight was that every human is walking around with two processors running in parallel. One processor is that gut instinct, that intuitive perception of the world, and the other is the analytic, more rational, and reasonable one. Now, the gut perception of how the world works is very dominant among founders and very dominant among early teams. It has to be, because if you stack up the evidence, it would all point to, please don't do this for a living. So they're following their gut, their instinct, but I like to see the evidence, and it's not hard to find in people who, who operate this way, see evidence that they're willing to reevaluate their gut, and they're willing to subject their gut to market forces and market discipline. So if they're kind of a high velocity, intuitive, and rational cycle is, is going, I think then that, that, that shows up, and that's the kind of person I like to back, the practical, uh, Measure of that is How fast do they release prototypes? How many days a week do they push new software to production? How quickly do they start sketching an idea versus just talking about it in very macro terms? And how quickly does a pen go to paper? Those are markers of people who operate at the kind of velocity that I think is nece…

AI assessment note: “see evidence that they're willing to reevaluate their gut”

Q in terms of being able to lead rounds and ownership stakes. So if we're to take kind of three core tenets that I always feel are kind of quite crucial, I'd love to start with price sensitivity. Peter Fenton said on the show, never turn down a company based on valuation. It's a mental trap. How would you respond to that, and what would you evaluate as your price sensitivity-ness?

A Well, I'm tempted to say that if I had Peter Fenton's resources, I might feel exactly the same way. Uh, But, but I think where I come down on this is the message I see behind his comment or the assumption beneath that statement is that price is but one consideration and that you always have to manage your sensitivity to price against your conviction in the business and the team. And so the way I think about it is I try to stay away, put it mildly, stay away from situations where pricing expectations are totally out of whack with the opportunity and the team's level of progress so far. Look, I mean, pricing is the way that we manage our risk. It's the primary tool I have to manage my own risk in the situation. And so as my risk goes up, my price should go down and vice versa. And so I just try to keep a very disciplined view of, okay, given the level of progress they've made, given the level of potential outcomes here, what's a percentage ownership that I feel comfortable with? And what's the check size that feels right to go with that? And have a very honest conversation with the team about how my thinking evolved around each of those points. I would agree with Peter if what Peter means is that pricing is one consideration, and for those companies that you have strong conviction and you have evidence of terrific progress, you should be willing to pay up for those.

AI assessment note: “pricing is the way that we manage our risk. It's the primary tool”

Q In terms of kind of another core tenant, recycling is one that's always very interesting for me, especially with kind of smaller fund sizes, and as you said, not the resources of Peter Fenton. Uh, so with a fund size like Harrison Metal, how do you think about recycling and really kind of optimizing every dollar?

A Well, we've done a little bit of it over the years, but it's really not a core part of the strategy. And, you know, I've talked to people who feel very differently and who run terrifically profitable businesses and who believe very strongly that recycling is an important part of the strategy. I mean, if I did it, it was in the case, it was in a, just a handful of cases where, you know, we were slightly off on reserves. I don't consider it a bulk part of the strategy because let's be honest, my numbers call it On a fund are driven by my initial investment picking. So picking is the primary thing I do. If I pick really well, I should generate great multiples and, and liquidity for my investors. I just sort of have an operating principle that I want that liquidity back in their hands as quickly as possible. When you stop and think about the mission of these organizations, universities, museums, scientific research foundations, getting that cash back to them is incredibly important. So I tend not to try to hold back liquidity once I get it.

AI assessment note: “we've done a little bit of it over the years, but it's really not a core part”

Q If we expand that kind of assessment to the wider management team, how do you assess the quality of the management team as a broader spectrum, not just the founder? Is there a process So you've developed behind it.

A Yeah, I'm sort of a disciple of this fellow named Daniel McCallum, who was an executive in the railroads in the mid-eighteen hundreds. Uh, Daniel's story was he was promoted up from within the railroad, from the inside the New York and Erie railroad, which was a huge high growth company of its day. He was promoted up from individual carpenter to bridge builder to superintendent of bridges, and then up through the ranks of general management until he found himself very quickly at the top Essentially what would today be called the CEO of the railroad. And he wrote this treatise on general management, which I still use to this day in teaching the general management class that I do at Harrison Metal. His philosophy boiled down to a handful of things. He said, look, the general manager has to get everybody aligned behind the right projects, the right investments. Second, make sure that the responsibility and authority is allocated appropriately. Third, measure how things are going along the way. Fourth, stop and make corrections if things are going badly. Fifth, do all of this with humanity and respect for other people. Now, the way he phrased humanity and respect for other people was in a very 19th century way. It was don't embarrass people who are senior, et cetera. But I, you know, I sort of round that up to treat other people the way they deserve to be treated. So that checklist…

AI assessment note: “I could take that checklist into any company. I could talk To a handful of people”

Q In terms of the signaling function and potential negative signaling function, is it a case where you have to at least put some dollars into the companies that you initially go into?

A No, and I really straightforward Forward with the founders about that. I mean, I have reserves. They also understand that I don't have unlimited resources, and so I have to make decisions on the margin, and I have to say, is this the highest and best use of this one dollar? And just try to be transparent about that. I've rarely come into a situation where I've completely pulled out. I mean, it has happened, but usually for real values violations, you know, dishonesty, and thank God that's only happened, like, you know, two times out of more than a hundred cases. But yeah, so the reserve's Strategy for me is to treat it like, as you said, it's a fresh backing decision. Would I, if presented with this opportunity, make that investment today on behalf of my investors? And so, uh, try to treat it very much like a fresh decision.

AI assessment note: “No, and I really straightforward Forward with the founders about that.”

Q Absolutely. And another balance that I'd love to address is at the early stages, obviously, there's this kind of environment of iteration and testing. I'd love to hear how you assess the balance in founders between vision to carry on and pursue the mission, and then stubbornness to continue with something that's not working. How do you look to judge between the two?

A I think, you know, everybody walks around with these sort of, I'm a big fan of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, and you know, their big insight was that every human is walking around with two processors running in parallel. One processor is that gut instinct, that intuitive perception of the world, and the other is the analytic, more rational, and reasonable one. Now, the gut perception of how the world works is very dominant among founders and very dominant among early teams. It has to be, because if you stack up the evidence, it would all point to, please don't do this for a living. So they're following their gut, their instinct, but I like to see the evidence, and it's not hard to find in people who, who operate this way, see evidence that they're willing to reevaluate their gut, and they're willing to subject their gut to market forces and market discipline. So if they're kind of a high velocity, intuitive, and rational cycle is, is going, I think then that, that, that shows up, and that's the kind of person I like to back, the practical, uh, Measure of that is How fast do they release prototypes? How many days a week do they push new software to production? How quickly do they start sketching an idea versus just talking about it in very macro terms? And how quickly does a pen go to paper? Those are markers of people who operate at the kind of velocity that I think is nece…

AI assessment note: “How fast do they release prototypes? How many days a week do they push new software”

Q You've worked with some of the very best. Is there anything that separates the truly great from, from the good?

A Yeah, I think the personal exceptionalism point is important because that's That's the reservoir, that confidence that you are capable of building extraordinary things. That confidence is very necessary in the low points to get you through those disappointments. But in addition to that, I'd say high velocity, the fact that their impatience and their ability to iterate their product and their service and their team and every aspect of their business system is hugely important. And I also think this checklist of five things that McCallum gave us, if they are good at those five things, they are in the Pathetic indictment of the state of general management that it's that easy to be exceptional, but it really is. Uh, it really is, and I'm encouraged by how many people are starting to realize that it'd be hard to not conclude that general management matters just reading the news.

AI assessment note: “personal exceptionalism point is important because that's That's the reservoir”

Q You've worked with some of the very best. Is there anything that separates the truly great from, from the good?

A Yeah, I think the personal exceptionalism point is important because that's That's the reservoir, that confidence that you are capable of building extraordinary things. That confidence is very necessary in the low points to get you through those disappointments. But in addition to that, I'd say high velocity, the fact that their impatience and their ability to iterate their product and their service and their team and every aspect of their business system is hugely important. And I also think this checklist of five things that McCallum gave us, if they are good at those five things, they are in the Pathetic indictment of the state of general management that it's that easy to be exceptional, but it really is. Uh, it really is, and I'm encouraged by how many people are starting to realize that it'd be hard to not conclude that general management matters just reading the news.

AI assessment note: “high velocity, the fact that their impatience and their ability to iterate”

Q No, I will check in and see that. You've said before that founders are the benevolent dictators when it comes to product roadmap. Does this change today, then, with the likes of Travis at Uber?

A Well, him, I don't know. I only know what I read, and I hesitate to opine on that. I would say that benevolent dictatorship is a, is a beautiful thing, and When CEOs can master and notice the word benevolent comes first, um, you know, in that, in that label, if they can manage to be that benevolent dictator, it is a beautiful thing. The benevolent dictator in product roadmap decisions to me is a, is a very listening focused executive. She, or he spends a ton of time listening to people. And then after the listening is done, there is a judgment question. Call. And listen, this is what we pay people for is to make judgments. We don't pay people to run AB tests. We don't pay people to do boil the ocean analytics on what is the quote right answer. We pay people for their judgment. And so when she or he exercises that judgment, I think that's a magic moment and product roadmap is a, is a particularly powerful place to exercise that judgment.

AI assessment note: “Well, him, I don't know. I only know what I read”