The Exchanges

Q Can I ask, when do you think boards can be really impactful? When are they really productive and helpful?

A Because I'm going to overgeneralize here. I think the nature of the question is, like, boards are, when it's a question of maximizing momentum, boards can be really helpful. You know, in other words, when things are going more or less ok, The strategy's more or less ok. The world's more or less ok. Boards can help you get the most out of that situation. And I think boards are typically not that good on the company's worst day. I always say to the CEO when they're bringing in board people, don't picture them today. Picture them on the worst day. Picture them, you've missed a quarter, an activist shows up, the technology doesn't work, your best person left. Picture how your board's going to act on the worst day, and then you can determine whether or not The board is going to be helpful to you or not. Harry, too many board members put themselves first, their own reputation, and not enough board members put the company first, right? I remember a decade ago, Jamie Dimon is a good friend of mine, and he's an awesome guy, one of the best CEOs of this generation. He was going through a tough time after the financial crisis because of what was called the London whale, right? So he was really in the crosshairs, and we were talking about his board, and he talked about Lee Raymond, Who was the lead director, ex-CEO of Exxon. And Jamie says, you know, the difference between Lee and every ot…

AI assessment note: “when it's a question of maximizing momentum, boards can be really helpful.”

Q it, and I really want to start on kind of the element of innovation. You know, you spent a lot of time and resources really investing in innovation at GE and committed to it very strongly. I want to start on kind of almost a review in hindsight, which is like, when you look at the strategy, what part of strategy really worked out well, and would you do again?

A So I would say that we were a big company, and so I think the part of innovation that worked best was Was the kind of innovation that could really leverage scale and make size an advantage and not a disadvantage. So for instance, we were a great global company. We moved from, you know, being a core imaging company in healthcare to doing life sciences. We were a very good clean tech company because we could leverage everything we'd done in the energy sector, in the aviation sector. So the places where innovation worked were places where we could really leverage Size and make size an advantage. And those are the businesses that, you know, we built a twenty billion dollar wind business. We had a immensely successful life sciences business. We were an eighty billion dollar company outside the United States. You know, just the size and scope, those are the things that work the best.

AI assessment note: “the part of innovation that worked best was Was the kind of innovation that could really leverage scale”

Q it, and I really want to start on kind of the element of innovation. You know, you spent a lot of time and resources really investing in innovation at GE and committed to it very strongly. I want to start on kind of almost a review in hindsight, which is like, when you look at the strategy, what part of strategy really worked out well, and would you do again?

A So I would say that we were a big company, and so I think the part of innovation that worked best was Was the kind of innovation that could really leverage scale and make size an advantage and not a disadvantage. So for instance, we were a great global company. We moved from, you know, being a core imaging company in healthcare to doing life sciences. We were a very good clean tech company because we could leverage everything we'd done in the energy sector, in the aviation sector. So the places where innovation worked were places where we could really leverage Size and make size an advantage. And those are the businesses that, you know, we built a twenty billion dollar wind business. We had a immensely successful life sciences business. We were an eighty billion dollar company outside the United States. You know, just the size and scope, those are the things that work the best.

AI assessment note: “the part of innovation that worked best was Was the kind of innovation that could really leverage scale”

Q Can I ask, when do you think boards can be really impactful? When are they really productive and helpful?

A Because I'm going to overgeneralize here. I think the nature of the question is, like, boards are, when it's a question of maximizing momentum, boards can be really helpful. You know, in other words, when things are going more or less ok, The strategy's more or less ok. The world's more or less ok. Boards can help you get the most out of that situation. And I think boards are typically not that good on the company's worst day. I always say to the CEO when they're bringing in board people, don't picture them today. Picture them on the worst day. Picture them, you've missed a quarter, an activist shows up, the technology doesn't work, your best person left. Picture how your board's going to act on the worst day, and then you can determine whether or not The board is going to be helpful to you or not. Harry, too many board members put themselves first, their own reputation, and not enough board members put the company first, right? I remember a decade ago, Jamie Dimon is a good friend of mine, and he's an awesome guy, one of the best CEOs of this generation. He was going through a tough time after the financial crisis because of what was called the London whale, right? So he was really in the crosshairs, and we were talking about his board, and he talked about Lee Raymond, Who was the lead director, ex-CEO of Exxon. And Jamie says, you know, the difference between Lee and every ot…

AI assessment note: “when it's a question of maximizing momentum, boards can be really helpful.”

Q I mean, the pleasure is all mine, Jeff, but I do want to start here with a bit of an unconventional question for the show, but it's take me back to the moment that you were named CEO at GE. Can you unpack that story and how it came about for us?

A Yeah, so, you know, a lot of people have forgotten about it, but back in the year, 2000, GE felt a lot like Amazon. It would be almost like taking over, you know, that caliber of company at the time, you know, whereas most CEO successions, they are done quietly. This was done loudly with three of us kind of competing for the job, if you will. I heard about it over Thanksgiving weekend of the year 2000, and I was told to fly to Florida and meet with, you know, the CEO at that time, Jack Welch and the board, and, uh, It was kind of an excruciating final year, and to be honest with you, like when it finally happened, it was more like relief than anything else. It was kind of like over, and I knew what my next gig was going to be, but it was just a very different context, and a very different time, and a very different process than one that anybody would do today.

AI assessment note: “I heard about it over Thanksgiving weekend of the year 2000, and I was told to fly to Florida”

Q this great schedule, and I'd like to ask none of the questions, but it's like, I think a lot of founders are fundamentally quite scared a lot of the time. They're scared of their board, they're scared of their team, their burn, the lack of product market fit. How do you think about, like, dealing with fear in leadership, and when you're kind of peering over the, you know, clifftop?

A Gosh, I think Good founders are afraid, right? I think there's a sense of paranoia that's very healthy, right? That's extremely healthy. I think one of the aspects of a board, somebody like me is to say, look, I've seen it before. Don't be afraid or be afraid of this. Not that you're afraid of the wrong thing. You're afraid of something else. But they're the kind of, when they're really at their most afraid, be there to say, we can do this, right? So I think the first thing is, Founders more than anybody else need people because it is a life of paranoia and fear. And the second thing is, is have a, like a hierarchy of be a slave to the market, be a slave to your market position, but don't worry about so many other things. In other words, if you're starting a company, you're really only allowed to be afraid of one thing, product market fit. That's it. We can help fill in the people. We can help fill in, you know, the funding. We can help fill in all those other things. But be afraid of the market. Be afraid of product market fit. Don't lose it. So be paranoid about the right things.

AI assessment note: “you're really only allowed to be afraid of one thing, product market fit.”

Q I totally get it. And I love that in terms of the growing up in a conglomerate and the difference it gives you. In terms of like the investing in innovation, when you look back at things that Didn't work. What do you think the core of those were, and why do you think they didn't work?

A Yeah, look, I'd say things that really required not just a new idea, but also a new culture at the same time, are really hard for legacy companies. And look, we started Internet of Things, Industrial Internet Initiative in 2009. We started it before anybody else got there, and we could see the power that data was going to have on the machines that we made, right? We saw that. And we tried to build, it wasn't like you could, in those days, you know, Microsoft or Salesforce or Amazon, nobody was really playing in that space, in the big data, AI space. So we kind of did it on our own, and we recruited, we did advertisements to recruit people and recruit talent, and we built, in its day, a decent-sized software business, but it was just too hard. You know, Harry, in other words, we had to recruit, we had to invest, We had to change the culture. We had to be able to leverage the internal at the same time that we were creating different kinds of people paid in a different way. And to a certain extent, being able to leverage all those things inside a legacy company, that's a real challenge. And I see it today. Look, I've sat in Silicon Valley now for four years. Every legacy CEO or my old friends who's thinking about digital transformation, they stop with me at some point during their trip to Silicon Valley and they say, hey, What doesn't work? And I'm happy to give them, you know, ki…

AI assessment note: “where I failed was I couldn't change the culture fast enough”

Q Totally with you in terms of that plasticity to move between roles within different boards. You mentioned, like, imagine your board on the hardest day. When you think back to, like, really hard days for you in leadership, bluntly, and sorry, I'm using this as, like, a consulting session. When you are in that shit and you can't see a way out, how did you deal with it?

A Yeah, look, I mean, I think, you know, really when you're in the middle of a crisis, I think the first thing is you want people that absorb fear. So you want people that don't become fear accelerators. They become fear absorbers. And it doesn't matter which crisis I've seen. I kind of go from nine 11 to the financial crisis to Fukushima to covid. You want people that can kind of, you know, the fear stops with me. People that can simplify and just say, OK, what problem do I need to solve today? Let's not worry about 17 things. Let's focus on what we have to do today. Really good communicate, you know, communications during a crisis are at a premium because so little is known. So you become kind of the expert, if you will, that's critical. And then you've got to be able to hold two truths at the same time. Like one is that things can always get worse, but the other one is there's going to be a future. And we want to make sure that we don't cut off any of the avenues that can lead to the future. So absorb fear, hold two truths, solve what's the problem in front of you, communicate, And then the last thing I'd say, Harry, is you want to keep your eyes up to look around your team and see who's panicking, who's awful, and have a sense for, you know, how we can, as we get out of the mess, who you want really on your team, because you never know anything about anybody in a good day. Yo…

AI assessment note: “absorb fear, hold two truths, solve what's the problem in front of you, communicate”

Q I totally get it. And I love that in terms of the growing up in a conglomerate and the difference it gives you. In terms of like the investing in innovation, when you look back at things that Didn't work. What do you think the core of those were, and why do you think they didn't work?

A Yeah, look, I'd say things that really required not just a new idea, but also a new culture at the same time, are really hard for legacy companies. And look, we started Internet of Things, Industrial Internet Initiative in 2009. We started it before anybody else got there, and we could see the power that data was going to have on the machines that we made, right? We saw that. And we tried to build, it wasn't like you could, in those days, you know, Microsoft or Salesforce or Amazon, nobody was really playing in that space, in the big data, AI space. So we kind of did it on our own, and we recruited, we did advertisements to recruit people and recruit talent, and we built, in its day, a decent-sized software business, but it was just too hard. You know, Harry, in other words, we had to recruit, we had to invest, We had to change the culture. We had to be able to leverage the internal at the same time that we were creating different kinds of people paid in a different way. And to a certain extent, being able to leverage all those things inside a legacy company, that's a real challenge. And I see it today. Look, I've sat in Silicon Valley now for four years. Every legacy CEO or my old friends who's thinking about digital transformation, they stop with me at some point during their trip to Silicon Valley and they say, hey, What doesn't work? And I'm happy to give them, you know, ki…

AI assessment note: “where I failed was I couldn't change the culture fast enough”

Q Can I ask you a weird question? Do you always believe it? And it's like the external can say, hey, Jeff and team, we're, we can do this. We as a collective can achieve. And then you retreat to your own office, and you go, oh, shit, there's no way we're going to do this.

A It's an interesting thing, Harry. Like, in other words, big companies run on momentum, and you need to be able to talk a Big game. But behind closed doors, know what you can do and can't do, right? But you need to project, you know, the sense that you can do it. And the trick of the whole thing is to be irrational, but listen at the same time. You need to set irrational aspirations, but at the same time have people that are coming in the side door saying, that's going to really not work, Jeff. You really have to understand. That one's a dumb idea. But you have to play both because, uh, size is a huge advantage when you've got momentum going the right way. And it's a huge disadvantage when the momentum stops, and that's true.

AI assessment note: “behind closed doors, know what you can do and can't do, right?”

Q Totally with you in terms of that plasticity to move between roles within different boards. You mentioned, like, imagine your board on the hardest day. When you think back to, like, really hard days for you in leadership, bluntly, and sorry, I'm using this as, like, a consulting session. When you are in that shit and you can't see a way out, how did you deal with it?

A Yeah, look, I mean, I think, you know, really when you're in the middle of a crisis, I think the first thing is you want people that absorb fear. So you want people that don't become fear accelerators. They become fear absorbers. And it doesn't matter which crisis I've seen. I kind of go from nine 11 to the financial crisis to Fukushima to covid. You want people that can kind of, you know, the fear stops with me. People that can simplify and just say, OK, what problem do I need to solve today? Let's not worry about 17 things. Let's focus on what we have to do today. Really good communicate, you know, communications during a crisis are at a premium because so little is known. So you become kind of the expert, if you will, that's critical. And then you've got to be able to hold two truths at the same time. Like one is that things can always get worse, but the other one is there's going to be a future. And we want to make sure that we don't cut off any of the avenues that can lead to the future. So absorb fear, hold two truths, solve what's the problem in front of you, communicate, And then the last thing I'd say, Harry, is you want to keep your eyes up to look around your team and see who's panicking, who's awful, and have a sense for, you know, how we can, as we get out of the mess, who you want really on your team, because you never know anything about anybody in a good day. Yo…

AI assessment note: “absorb fear, hold two truths, solve what's the problem in front of you”

Q I mean, the pleasure is all mine, Jeff, but I do want to start here with a bit of an unconventional question for the show, but it's take me back to the moment that you were named CEO at GE. Can you unpack that story and how it came about for us?

A Yeah, so, you know, a lot of people have forgotten about it, but back in the year, 2000, GE felt a lot like Amazon. It would be almost like taking over, you know, that caliber of company at the time, you know, whereas most CEO successions, they are done quietly. This was done loudly with three of us kind of competing for the job, if you will. I heard about it over Thanksgiving weekend of the year 2000, and I was told to fly to Florida and meet with, you know, the CEO at that time, Jack Welch and the board, and, uh, It was kind of an excruciating final year, and to be honest with you, like when it finally happened, it was more like relief than anything else. It was kind of like over, and I knew what my next gig was going to be, but it was just a very different context, and a very different time, and a very different process than one that anybody would do today.

AI assessment note: “I heard about it over Thanksgiving weekend of the year 2000”

Q Can I push you there though? And I'll say bluntly in defense of you, is there anything that you could have done sitting in such a large company when you're competing against Two to eight people companies who can change cultures and change innovation cycles so fast. Is there anything that you or plenty any other incumbent CEO can do?

A Here's what I would have done differently, you know, Harry, in all honesty, I've had four years to think about it, is I would have either bought a part of a startup company or done a joint venture with maybe salesforce.com or Microsoft and created a new co, created separate currency, and really be able to give a platform for the people to plug into. You know, at the end of the day, it's all about people. You've got to have a value prop that can recruit. You've got to be able to pay people consistent with, you know, the world that they're in. And we just couldn't do all those things. So I would have taken all the same ideas because we had the use case. You know, in other words, what legacy companies don't realize is they have the keys to the kingdom and that you own the use case really, which is, you know, like I sit with startups and they're saying, you know, I want to add 10 salespeople. And I say, you know, guys, really back in the day, I had 40,000 salespeople like I could sell. And a 180 countries around the world, and they look at me and say, holy shit, that's amazing, you know. But I couldn't recruit the right talent, right? I had a difficult time paying them, and I really would have done it differently. I would have still kept the promise. But I think one thing legacy companies have to get good at is managing the complexity of kind of sidecar businesses with either found…

AI assessment note: “Here's what I would have done differently... bought a part of a startup company”

Q this great schedule, and I'd like to ask none of the questions, but it's like, I think a lot of founders are fundamentally quite scared a lot of the time. They're scared of their board, they're scared of their team, their burn, the lack of product market fit. How do you think about, like, dealing with fear in leadership, and when you're kind of peering over the, you know, clifftop?

A Gosh, I think Good founders are afraid, right? I think there's a sense of paranoia that's very healthy, right? That's extremely healthy. I think one of the aspects of a board, somebody like me is to say, look, I've seen it before. Don't be afraid or be afraid of this. Not that you're afraid of the wrong thing. You're afraid of something else. But they're the kind of, when they're really at their most afraid, be there to say, we can do this, right? So I think the first thing is, Founders more than anybody else need people because it is a life of paranoia and fear. And the second thing is, is have a, like a hierarchy of be a slave to the market, be a slave to your market position, but don't worry about so many other things. In other words, if you're starting a company, you're really only allowed to be afraid of one thing, product market fit. That's it. We can help fill in the people. We can help fill in, you know, the funding. We can help fill in all those other things. But be afraid of the market. Be afraid of product market fit. Don't lose it. So be paranoid about the right things.

AI assessment note: “Founders more than anybody else need people... be paranoid about the right things.”

Q Can I push you there though? And I'll say bluntly in defense of you, is there anything that you could have done sitting in such a large company when you're competing against Two to eight people companies who can change cultures and change innovation cycles so fast. Is there anything that you or plenty any other incumbent CEO can do?

A Here's what I would have done differently, you know, Harry, in all honesty, I've had four years to think about it, is I would have either bought a part of a startup company or done a joint venture with maybe salesforce.com or Microsoft and created a new co, created separate currency, and really be able to give a platform for the people to plug into. You know, at the end of the day, it's all about people. You've got to have a value prop that can recruit. You've got to be able to pay people consistent with, you know, the world that they're in. And we just couldn't do all those things. So I would have taken all the same ideas because we had the use case. You know, in other words, what legacy companies don't realize is they have the keys to the kingdom and that you own the use case really, which is, you know, like I sit with startups and they're saying, you know, I want to add 10 salespeople. And I say, you know, guys, really back in the day, I had 40,000 salespeople like I could sell. And a 180 countries around the world, and they look at me and say, holy shit, that's amazing, you know. But I couldn't recruit the right talent, right? I had a difficult time paying them, and I really would have done it differently. I would have still kept the promise. But I think one thing legacy companies have to get good at is managing the complexity of kind of sidecar businesses with either found…

AI assessment note: “Here's what I would have done differently... I would have either bought a part of a startup company”

Q Now, on the VC side, do you enjoy board meetings, and how do you find them? You know, you've gone from CEO, GE, managing GE's board, which is a very different style of board to a startup board. Do you enjoy them, and how do you find that dynamic?

A You know, I still miss operations, but I think the role that I play, particularly with startups, is I pick a swim lane. You know, in other words, I come and listen to the first meeting. I try to get to know the CEO, and then I kind of see what's open, which swim lane is open to me because typically on the boards, I have the broadest experience and I have the most experience in most of the boards I'm on. We're all investors. I'm not sure I'm a better or worse investor than anybody, but I know how to sell. I know how to globalize. I know how to hire managers. You know, I know what really bad shit looks like. So I pick a swim lane and I think again, I like private boards better than public boards. I think the best boards are joyful, the worst boards are painful, but I do all, any board work I do, I do because I really love the CEO, and I'm really trying to help him out in whatever way I can.

AI assessment note: “I like private boards better than public boards. I think the best boards are joyful”

Q Now, on the VC side, do you enjoy board meetings, and how do you find them? You know, you've gone from CEO, GE, managing GE's board, which is a very different style of board to a startup board. Do you enjoy them, and how do you find that dynamic?

A You know, I still miss operations, but I think the role that I play, particularly with startups, is I pick a swim lane. You know, in other words, I come and listen to the first meeting. I try to get to know the CEO, and then I kind of see what's open, which swim lane is open to me because typically on the boards, I have the broadest experience and I have the most experience in most of the boards I'm on. We're all investors. I'm not sure I'm a better or worse investor than anybody, but I know how to sell. I know how to globalize. I know how to hire managers. You know, I know what really bad shit looks like. So I pick a swim lane and I think again, I like private boards better than public boards. I think the best boards are joyful, the worst boards are painful, but I do all, any board work I do, I do because I really love the CEO, and I'm really trying to help him out in whatever way I can.

AI assessment note: “I like private boards better than public boards. I think the best boards are joyful”

Q I mean, there absolutely is. Can I ask, you mentioned kind of getting beat by Wall Street Journal, and there's always critics. I find it really hard now, Jeff. Like, I get hurt when I see horrible articles about me, or some journalist writes something horrible about me. How did you build a layer of self-protection to not get hurt with every knock that comes?

A Yeah, look, I was off-criticized, for sure. Look, I think part of it is... Part of your being, you know, self-reflection, self-renewal, and the ability to kind of get up morning after morning with a smile on your face and just be able to renew yourself in a minute or in a six hours or an eight hours or a month or a year. This sense of perseverance and self-renewal. So many nights I went to bed beaten up and feeling like a failure and woke up the next morning and said, you know, you're the best in the world. Nobody could do it like you could do it, right? So part of it is Inherent thing you learned from your parents or something like that. The other pieces I say is this is something that people, everybody lies about. Everybody lies and says, I've got thick skin. Nobody has thick skin. Sorry, nobody has thick skin. You just choose to take a high road. You just choose to take a different path. And I think people have to realize, look, we just live in a hater's world. I don't know what it is. I don't know if it's social media, what aspect it is, but we live in a world where it's easier to criticize than at any other time. And so I think people just have to You just learn to take the high road.

AI assessment note: “Nobody has thick skin. You just choose to take a high road.”

Q I mean, there absolutely is. Can I ask, you mentioned kind of getting beat by Wall Street Journal, and there's always critics. I find it really hard now, Jeff. Like, I get hurt when I see horrible articles about me, or some journalist writes something horrible about me. How did you build a layer of self-protection to not get hurt with every knock that comes?

A Yeah, look, I was off-criticized, for sure. Look, I think part of it is... Part of your being, you know, self-reflection, self-renewal, and the ability to kind of get up morning after morning with a smile on your face and just be able to renew yourself in a minute or in a six hours or an eight hours or a month or a year. This sense of perseverance and self-renewal. So many nights I went to bed beaten up and feeling like a failure and woke up the next morning and said, you know, you're the best in the world. Nobody could do it like you could do it, right? So part of it is Inherent thing you learned from your parents or something like that. The other pieces I say is this is something that people, everybody lies about. Everybody lies and says, I've got thick skin. Nobody has thick skin. Sorry, nobody has thick skin. You just choose to take a high road. You just choose to take a different path. And I think people have to realize, look, we just live in a hater's world. I don't know what it is. I don't know if it's social media, what aspect it is, but we live in a world where it's easier to criticize than at any other time. And so I think people just have to You just learn to take the high road.

AI assessment note: “This sense of perseverance and self-renewal. So many nights I went to bed beaten up”

Q happen now? So I'm totally with you there. Can I ask also, you know, when we look at like the drumbeat of every quarter and hitting targets and hitting public market expectations, bluntly, did you ever sit back and go, yeah, we did a good job. I'm happy with that. Well done, Jeff. Like, do you sit back and appreciate it a little bit? Otherwise, it's just an ongoing grind.

A Yeah, look, I mean, I think you have to create what is And what you want to hold your team accountable for and be very transparent about that. And sometimes that aligns with what investors think. And sometimes it doesn't align what investors think. And that's just the nature of the beast. Look, probably the best year my team and I had, best two years, was 2008 and 2009 during the financial crisis. And we were getting creamed in the marketplace and criticized in the Wall Street Journal and every place else. But we were the world's biggest finance company when Lehman Brothers went bankrupt. You know, our ship took a torpedo in the engine room, and we swam to shore, right? We made it to shore, we saved the company, we preserved the businesses, and I would say to people, look, no other team on earth could have done what we did. And I was proud of the team, and I felt great about what we'd done in a moment where, look, it was terrible. If you were in financial services, that was terrible. But I think, Look, you've got to say a lot about Jeff Bezos and Elon Musk and some of those guys who have created immensely valuable companies, but done it on their terms, you know, particularly Jeff. I think, you know, Jeff just retired a day or two ago or whenever he did. You know, Jeff created the world's most valuable company, and he really did it on his terms. He said, look, I'm not going to m…

AI assessment note: “And I was proud of the team, and I felt great about what we'd done”

Q Can I ask you a weird question? Do you always believe it? And it's like the external can say, hey, Jeff and team, we're, we can do this. We as a collective can achieve. And then you retreat to your own office, and you go, oh, shit, there's no way we're going to do this.

A It's an interesting thing, Harry. Like, in other words, big companies run on momentum, and you need to be able to talk a Big game. But behind closed doors, know what you can do and can't do, right? But you need to project, you know, the sense that you can do it. And the trick of the whole thing is to be irrational, but listen at the same time. You need to set irrational aspirations, but at the same time have people that are coming in the side door saying, that's going to really not work, Jeff. You really have to understand. That one's a dumb idea. But you have to play both because, uh, size is a huge advantage when you've got momentum going the right way. And it's a huge disadvantage when the momentum stops, and that's true.

AI assessment note: “behind closed doors, know what you can do and can't do”

Q people to say, ah, Jeff, that's not a good idea. I agree, but oftentimes, I mean, that's always down to actually the leader ensuring that the people around them feel comfortable enough to say, Jeff, I disagree with you, and you're wrong here. Like, how do you create an environment where your C-suite and the closest people around you feel they can push back and they can tell you anything?

A You need to be around people you trust. We really need to be around. You've got to have some people around you that you've been through the battles with and that you trust. You know, I teach now a second year class at Sanford Business School, and the kids at school, you know, they're really touchy-feely and all this stuff. They teach them, like, listen to everybody. Everybody's right, you know, and if you listen to everybody, things are going to be great. That's not true, right? What's true is you can get as much trouble by listening, also in the same way trouble by listening too much, right? So the trick is having people you trust. And people that are different than you are, have different contexts, have different thoughts, but what they're saying to you is not, we don't want to. What they're saying is, here's how we can do it better. Here's how we can adjust. And that's kind of the people you want around you. I guarantee you that if Elon Musk or Jeff Bezos or Mark Benioff ever did a review, a three 60, the people around them aren't saying they're really good listeners. There's a lot of people say, They didn't listen to it, but they are listening, right? They are listening, but they're listening to the core of people that they can really help make things better.

AI assessment note: “You've got to have some people around you that you've been through the battles with”

Q people to say, ah, Jeff, that's not a good idea. I agree, but oftentimes, I mean, that's always down to actually the leader ensuring that the people around them feel comfortable enough to say, Jeff, I disagree with you, and you're wrong here. Like, how do you create an environment where your C-suite and the closest people around you feel they can push back and they can tell you anything?

A You need to be around people you trust. We really need to be around. You've got to have some people around you that you've been through the battles with and that you trust. You know, I teach now a second year class at Sanford Business School, and the kids at school, you know, they're really touchy-feely and all this stuff. They teach them, like, listen to everybody. Everybody's right, you know, and if you listen to everybody, things are going to be great. That's not true, right? What's true is you can get as much trouble by listening, also in the same way trouble by listening too much, right? So the trick is having people you trust. And people that are different than you are, have different contexts, have different thoughts, but what they're saying to you is not, we don't want to. What they're saying is, here's how we can do it better. Here's how we can adjust. And that's kind of the people you want around you. I guarantee you that if Elon Musk or Jeff Bezos or Mark Benioff ever did a review, a three 60, the people around them aren't saying they're really good listeners. There's a lot of people say, They didn't listen to it, but they are listening, right? They are listening, but they're listening to the core of people that they can really help make things better.

AI assessment note: “So the trick is having people you trust.”

Q the best talent, I do think about this quite a lot, though, because I think, you know, in a world of such capital supply, Today, startups can afford to pay as much, if not more, than incumbents in terms of salaries. They can afford the flexibility of work, the autonomy. Bluntly, and this is my question, how on earth can incumbents ever offer the same on a talent attraction basis?

A Oh, again, you have to solve the comp problem, really. And I've seen that. I've learned that more as a VC, even than I saw before, and that you need kind of a separate currency. If you're not going to pay the people the same way that they can get paid In startup world, you just are never going to get to where you need to get to, right? Look, I think of all the legacy players that I see, you know, and again, I think Walmart has played it reasonably well, right? They acquired jet. They've made investments in talent. They use their foundation to compete. Look, you can't give up, but you know, Harry, look, I did the job from, let's say, 2002 1016. In the year 2000, industrials and financial services, let's say between those two, it was 40% of the S&P 500 value. Now it's 15%, you know. All the value that's been created in the last 20 years has fundamentally been created in tech land and with startups, and I admire the people that have done it, but I don't think that speaks well for any of us, really, in terms of, in terms of what's gone on, because the theory I always had, probably naively so, I always ran the company with the belief that we could do anything that we set our mind to, and like I said, maybe sometimes I was naive, but I think as a CEO, it's helpful to have a spirit That somewhat has that headset, or else the world's changing too quickly.

AI assessment note: “you have to solve the comp problem, really... you need kind of a separate currency.”

Q happen now? So I'm totally with you there. Can I ask also, you know, when we look at like the drumbeat of every quarter and hitting targets and hitting public market expectations, bluntly, did you ever sit back and go, yeah, we did a good job. I'm happy with that. Well done, Jeff. Like, do you sit back and appreciate it a little bit? Otherwise, it's just an ongoing grind.

A Yeah, look, I mean, I think you have to create what is And what you want to hold your team accountable for and be very transparent about that. And sometimes that aligns with what investors think. And sometimes it doesn't align what investors think. And that's just the nature of the beast. Look, probably the best year my team and I had, best two years, was 2008 and 2009 during the financial crisis. And we were getting creamed in the marketplace and criticized in the Wall Street Journal and every place else. But we were the world's biggest finance company when Lehman Brothers went bankrupt. You know, our ship took a torpedo in the engine room, and we swam to shore, right? We made it to shore, we saved the company, we preserved the businesses, and I would say to people, look, no other team on earth could have done what we did. And I was proud of the team, and I felt great about what we'd done in a moment where, look, it was terrible. If you were in financial services, that was terrible. But I think, Look, you've got to say a lot about Jeff Bezos and Elon Musk and some of those guys who have created immensely valuable companies, but done it on their terms, you know, particularly Jeff. I think, you know, Jeff just retired a day or two ago or whenever he did. You know, Jeff created the world's most valuable company, and he really did it on his terms. He said, look, I'm not going to m…

AI assessment note: “I was proud of the team, and I felt great about what we'd done”

Q the best talent, I do think about this quite a lot, though, because I think, you know, in a world of such capital supply, Today, startups can afford to pay as much, if not more, than incumbents in terms of salaries. They can afford the flexibility of work, the autonomy. Bluntly, and this is my question, how on earth can incumbents ever offer the same on a talent attraction basis?

A Oh, again, you have to solve the comp problem, really. And I've seen that. I've learned that more as a VC, even than I saw before, and that you need kind of a separate currency. If you're not going to pay the people the same way that they can get paid In startup world, you just are never going to get to where you need to get to, right? Look, I think of all the legacy players that I see, you know, and again, I think Walmart has played it reasonably well, right? They acquired jet. They've made investments in talent. They use their foundation to compete. Look, you can't give up, but you know, Harry, look, I did the job from, let's say, 2002 1016. In the year 2000, industrials and financial services, let's say between those two, it was 40% of the S&P 500 value. Now it's 15%, you know. All the value that's been created in the last 20 years has fundamentally been created in tech land and with startups, and I admire the people that have done it, but I don't think that speaks well for any of us, really, in terms of, in terms of what's gone on, because the theory I always had, probably naively so, I always ran the company with the belief that we could do anything that we set our mind to, and like I said, maybe sometimes I was naive, but I think as a CEO, it's helpful to have a spirit That somewhat has that headset, or else the world's changing too quickly.

AI assessment note: “you have to solve the comp problem, really. And I've seen that.”