The Exchanges

Q Doug Leone said on the show and to me that, um, the venture business has transitioned from a boutique, uh, Kind of cottage industry to an institutionalized, commoditized asset class. Do you agree with that?

A As I said earlier, I think that the Andreessen's and the Sequoia's of this world, um, um, have become more institutionalized because of the large size of assets they manage. And you know, when you're managing tens of billions or hundreds of billions, it's, it's, it's hard to manage Single digit millions or, or 10 or twenty million, uh, with the same, um, attention, uh, and, uh, and the same oversight that you have on managing a five hundred million or a billion dollar position. Um, and I think that therein is the opportunity for artisanal or boutique or, or smaller VCs where it does matter to them. And, um, And a partner can bring the required attention for the required period of time to help you build your business.

AI assessment note: “I think that the Andreessen's and the Sequoia's of this world... have become more institutionalized”

Q in venture. Again, we've been, we've trained a generation that's all about getting in, and it's not. It's about getting out as well, and that is a very hard thing that I fucked up on in the last vintage. Admittedly, with a very small fund, so at least my learnings that, you know, contained. What are your biggest lessons on when to start selling down and how to sell down?

A So lessons learned, um, I, we, when we started Entree, we put down, uh, seven or eight principles, and one of the principles that we put down was, um, how do we not fall in love with The value we see on paper. And so we decided that the minute that the price per share of a current round is, uh, I won't tell you exactly, but six or eight times your, your price that you came into the round, uh, try sell a third. And when you get to the pre IPO round or in the IPO across that kind of timeframe, Try sell a third. And when the lockup expires after an IPO, sell everything and or distribute the stock. The, the idea behind it is that in the context of VC, we're private investors. We're not public investors. We're not, uh, Goldman Sachs or BlackRock or State Street or et cetera. We're, Our competence is getting the business to a place where there's liquidity and it's successful. From that point on, it's someone else's opportunity. We've kept to that, and, and that's managed to save us, both in the case of Kazoo, where the valuation got to two and a half billion pounds. I think it was pounds, you know, um, Two rounds, the round before the pre-IPO, and we sold a bunch.

AI assessment note: “when the price per share of a current round is... six or eight times”

Q I'm old school, Avi, despite my youth. And, you know, Peter Fenton said before on the show that price is a mental trap or valuation is a mental trap. Saul, who's on your team, said to me that price and valuation is something that you have spent a lot of time, kind of, uh, disciplining him on and talking about. How do you think about price sensitivity today in valuation?

A I don't like, uh, expensive deals. Um, what can you do? High price deals with, with a large amount of capital early in a, in a startup's life, um, closes opportunities for it. I think it creates, um, a situation where you're not really running the business as lean as you could be. Uh, you're not making the decisions that you should be doing at the earlier stages. I think it leads to bad decision, and I think it, it narrows the, uh, permutations of future fundraisings down the line. Having said that, in Israel, you know, there's, there's a big challenge where the, the top deals are typically six to twelve million dollars on, uh, anything from 15 to 30 or 40 pre's, and, and, and I suppose that Entree has done Uh, at the bottom end of it, I mean, we've written some checks at, you know, six on 12, six on 15, things like that, but we generally don't write the bigger, you know, the bigger checks, we, we definitely don't.

AI assessment note: “I don't like, uh, expensive deals.”

Q I'm old school, Avi, despite my youth. And, you know, Peter Fenton said before on the show that price is a mental trap or valuation is a mental trap. Saul, who's on your team, said to me that price and valuation is something that you have spent a lot of time, kind of, uh, disciplining him on and talking about. How do you think about price sensitivity today in valuation?

A I don't like, uh, expensive deals. Um, what can you do? High price deals with, with a large amount of capital early in a, in a startup's life, um, closes opportunities for it. I think it creates, um, a situation where you're not really running the business as lean as you could be. Uh, you're not making the decisions that you should be doing at the earlier stages. I think it leads to bad decision, and I think it, it narrows the, uh, permutations of future fundraisings down the line. Having said that, in Israel, you know, there's, there's a big challenge where the, the top deals are typically six to twelve million dollars on, uh, anything from 15 to 30 or 40 pre's, and, and, and I suppose that Entree has done Uh, at the bottom end of it, I mean, we've written some checks at, you know, six on 12, six on 15, things like that, but we generally don't write the bigger, you know, the bigger checks, we, we definitely don't.

AI assessment note: “I don't like, uh, expensive deals. Um, what can you do?”

Q I totally agree and get you there. Would you ever back a founder where you think the founder's great, but the market's horrible?

A I would, um, try get that founder to understand why I don't like the market. Um, and if I can, and that founder chooses a different market, then I'll try back them. In some cases, like in, in SeatGeek, they They started selling tickets, and then they found a wedge of getting in, they bought a company out of Israel called TopTex, which, uh, which provided software for, uh, event spaces and, and clubs to, to manage their ticketing. And that wedge, uh, got built into a big business. Here again, Monday.com is another one where they, they, they went after a kind of a general market, right? But they figured out a wedge. You know, that was a wedge, and now the big businesses in that is Monday Dev, which competes with Jira and things like that, and Monday CRM, which completes with Salesforce and Pipedrive and things like that, and they've built big markets.

AI assessment note: “if that founder chooses a different market, then I'll try back them.”

Q Do you like competitive markets? Like I, when people argue with me on the show about this, I hate competitive markets. You don't have pricing power, your caps are high, your retention's lower, product marketing's harder, but then people say, well, any worthy market's competitive, Harry. So, you know, nice thinking, which I think is bullshit. Um, how do you think about competition in markets?

A Competition is great when you're on top, right? Um, but I, I suppose competitive markets, people invest in, in those markets many times Uh, more vanity than sanity is, is kind of ruling the investment. Nothing wrong with competitive markets as long as you can have a good handle on your costs and you can win. I mean, if you, if you take a company of ours, SeatGeek, as an example, highly competitive market, uh, difficult margins, and yet they've managed to carve out a vertical offering within that market where Uh, they've gone deeper into the ticketing systems of, um, of the clubs and of the event spaces. Um, and so they've, they make money on, you know, like StubHub on, on selling tickets, but, but they do so much better because they starting to control, uh, the ticket generation, the tick, the price optimization, you know, all kinds, all kinds of things like that. So, um, I'm not afraid of big markets, but I'm wary of big markets, which are competitive.

AI assessment note: “Nothing wrong with competitive markets as long as you can have a good handle on your costs”

Q of who we are and how we think. And given we know each other and we've been for walks in the park and we have that relationship, I thought I'd just dive straight in. My mother's MS and actually my bulimia really shaped a lot of who I am today. When you think about maybe hardships in your childhood, What was the most prominent that shaped how you think today?

A So I didn't have a, uh, extremely challenging childhood, um, but, uh, I was born in Israel at a tough time, and, um, I grew up in a lower middle class family with a father who was mostly away in the military. At the age of five and a half, I was whisked away by my family, my parents, my, uh, to South Africa, and, uh, Pretty much dumped in a school, um, and left, uh, left to figure out a new language, figure out new friends, things like that, and integrate into, into a new environment. So it caused me to become very independent at a young age, um, and I had to figure out what, what needed to get done, so I worked hard, and, um, and I tried to get results, and, and I think that shaped me.

AI assessment note: “It caused me to become very independent at a young age”

Q Do you think founders want your help? I remember Jason Lampkin said on the show, no, no, founders just want you to give them money and sod off.

A It's great to have founders who don't need you. Um, in other words, you know, they come to you for advice every now and again. It, it's great because, you know, uh, from the perspective, if they know what they're doing and they're building a great business and it's, uh, And it's going great. So, you know, case in point, when you look at Monday at the beginning, we were very, very involved. And if you look at Monday, once it got to the C or D or E, it was a meeting every month or every, you know, something like that. It just changes. And then they just need course correction sometimes, or a bit of mentorship or a bit of, uh, alternative advice. But I think By and large, um, when you start a business, um, you can use help. I was a first time founder as well, and I made many mistakes, and, and the one thing that made me make many mistakes and yet still succeeds was, was that I had someone with more experience who was a mentor and, and, and could help. So, um, I wouldn't, um, be so bold as to say that everyone needs us, um, but it's good to have a partner along the way.

AI assessment note: “By and large, um, when you start a business, um, you can use help.”

Q Do you like competitive markets? Like I, when people argue with me on the show about this, I hate competitive markets. You don't have pricing power, your caps are high, your retention's lower, product marketing's harder, but then people say, well, any worthy market's competitive, Harry. So, you know, nice thinking, which I think is bullshit. Um, how do you think about competition in markets?

A Competition is great when you're on top, right? Um, but I, I suppose competitive markets, people invest in, in those markets many times Uh, more vanity than sanity is, is kind of ruling the investment. Nothing wrong with competitive markets as long as you can have a good handle on your costs and you can win. I mean, if you, if you take a company of ours, SeatGeek, as an example, highly competitive market, uh, difficult margins, and yet they've managed to carve out a vertical offering within that market where Uh, they've gone deeper into the ticketing systems of, um, of the clubs and of the event spaces. Um, and so they've, they make money on, you know, like StubHub on, on selling tickets, but, but they do so much better because they starting to control, uh, the ticket generation, the tick, the price optimization, you know, all kinds, all kinds of things like that. So, um, I'm not afraid of big markets, but I'm wary of big markets, which are competitive.

AI assessment note: “I'm not afraid of big markets, but I'm wary of big markets”

Q We're going to get to the post-investment. The other one, though, was TAM. I, I find TAM a wonderfully, um, Um, misleading topic. Um, because the greatest markets often start off as toys, or the greatest products start as toys, greatest markets don't exist. How do you think about Tam? What have been some of your biggest lessons in how to analyze markets when entering a business?

A Massive markets are great, but, uh, not every market is massive. You find great founders And those great founders are not necessarily running after massive markets, but if that founder and the business opportunity they have can be number one or number two in a, in a smaller market, um, then, and when I say number one or two, I mean it in terms of revenue, profit, then people will want it and there'll always be an exit path for it. Um, as I said before, more capital reduces the option. So in, in massive markets, you have to deploy Generally bigger capital, larger amounts of capital to, to fund because there are more competitors and there's, you know, um, and other things are happening. But we don't shy away from smaller markets. Uh, we want to make sure that you, you can absolutely be number one or number two in the, in that market. And then, you know, you'll get a reasonable return and three reasonable returns make a fund.

AI assessment note: “we don't shy away from smaller markets”

Q in venture. Again, we've been, we've trained a generation that's all about getting in, and it's not. It's about getting out as well, and that is a very hard thing that I fucked up on in the last vintage. Admittedly, with a very small fund, so at least my learnings that, you know, contained. What are your biggest lessons on when to start selling down and how to sell down?

A So lessons learned, um, I, we, when we started Entree, we put down, uh, seven or eight principles, and one of the principles that we put down was, um, how do we not fall in love with The value we see on paper. And so we decided that the minute that the price per share of a current round is, uh, I won't tell you exactly, but six or eight times your, your price that you came into the round, uh, try sell a third. And when you get to the pre IPO round or in the IPO across that kind of timeframe, Try sell a third. And when the lockup expires after an IPO, sell everything and or distribute the stock. The, the idea behind it is that in the context of VC, we're private investors. We're not public investors. We're not, uh, Goldman Sachs or BlackRock or State Street or et cetera. We're, Our competence is getting the business to a place where there's liquidity and it's successful. From that point on, it's someone else's opportunity. We've kept to that, and, and that's managed to save us, both in the case of Kazoo, where the valuation got to two and a half billion pounds. I think it was pounds, you know, um, Two rounds, the round before the pre-IPO, and we sold a bunch.

AI assessment note: “the minute that the price per share of a current round is... six or eight times”

Q Do you think founders want your help? I remember Jason Lampkin said on the show, no, no, founders just want you to give them money and sod off.

A It's great to have founders who don't need you. Um, in other words, you know, they come to you for advice every now and again. It, it's great because, you know, uh, from the perspective, if they know what they're doing and they're building a great business and it's, uh, And it's going great. So, you know, case in point, when you look at Monday at the beginning, we were very, very involved. And if you look at Monday, once it got to the C or D or E, it was a meeting every month or every, you know, something like that. It just changes. And then they just need course correction sometimes, or a bit of mentorship or a bit of, uh, alternative advice. But I think By and large, um, when you start a business, um, you can use help. I was a first time founder as well, and I made many mistakes, and, and the one thing that made me make many mistakes and yet still succeeds was, was that I had someone with more experience who was a mentor and, and, and could help. So, um, I wouldn't, um, be so bold as to say that everyone needs us, um, but it's good to have a partner along the way.

AI assessment note: “I wouldn't, um, be so bold as to say that everyone needs us”

Q Okay. Got you. There's this idea that you're not able to concentrate capital into your winners. It's like, I often hear it, which is like, well, that model doesn't work because if it's really working, Sequoia or Andreessen or whoever will just come in and just take the A and you won't see any of it. Is that incorrect, do you think?

A I don't think it's entirely incorrect. I think today you want to generally get the next round done by a fund that can do that, the round after that. So if you get a fund in to do the A, you want to know as a founder that the fund that's doing your A can do your B, can lead your B, because you don't know where the world will be in two, three years later, and you want your investors to be able to continue, and also continue when the chips are down, when, when things aren't great. And, and what we've found is that many times we've Lead the seed and lead the A in companies that, that weren't executing at the best, uh, at the best time. Um, but naturally what happens is that if you are, um, doing extremely well, then inherently you'll gravitate to tier one funds who want to lead and who write a bigger check and, you know, um, and we'll carry on. And we've kind of feel that, um, Playing together is better in the long term of the, in the long term interest of the business.

AI assessment note: “I don't think it's entirely incorrect.”

Q We're going to get to the post-investment. The other one, though, was TAM. I, I find TAM a wonderfully, um, Um, misleading topic. Um, because the greatest markets often start off as toys, or the greatest products start as toys, greatest markets don't exist. How do you think about Tam? What have been some of your biggest lessons in how to analyze markets when entering a business?

A Massive markets are great, but, uh, not every market is massive. You find great founders And those great founders are not necessarily running after massive markets, but if that founder and the business opportunity they have can be number one or number two in a, in a smaller market, um, then, and when I say number one or two, I mean it in terms of revenue, profit, then people will want it and there'll always be an exit path for it. Um, as I said before, more capital reduces the option. So in, in massive markets, you have to deploy Generally bigger capital, larger amounts of capital to, to fund because there are more competitors and there's, you know, um, and other things are happening. But we don't shy away from smaller markets. Uh, we want to make sure that you, you can absolutely be number one or number two in the, in that market. And then, you know, you'll get a reasonable return and three reasonable returns make a fund.

AI assessment note: “we don't shy away from smaller markets. Uh, we want to make sure”

Q so I did, but I do want to talk about Monday, because I spoke to Aaron before the show, fascinating chat, yeah, um, and I'd love to just start with that, like, how did you build conviction in Monday, when respectfully, SMBs was like, no, that's not a good market, CRM was like, no, that's not a good market, How did you see goodness when everyone else saw unattractive market?

A Starting off with Monday, um, the last business that I built myself was a SaaS product for the GRC market, governance compliance market, and I wanted to build it very open, but then we were using Microsoft SQL Server, you know, it was the early 2000, AWS wasn't around, you know, there were so many limitations, and I, and, and we built a successful business which we sold, but my vision was to build it In such a way that it wasn't vertical, uh, it would start vertical in Jersey, but move horizontal to other areas. And then Monday came along and I saw Monday and in that I saw everything that I wanted to build, but, but fleshed out so much better and no limitations because of AWS and things like that. And other VCs, other people saw Yammer or Slack or Or something like that. Um, and so, um, we were in, in, in the first round of, of Monday, and.

AI assessment note: “in that I saw everything that I wanted to build”

Q Doug Leone said on the show and to me that, um, the venture business has transitioned from a boutique, uh, Kind of cottage industry to an institutionalized, commoditized asset class. Do you agree with that?

A As I said earlier, I think that the Andreessen's and the Sequoia's of this world, um, um, have become more institutionalized because of the large size of assets they manage. And you know, when you're managing tens of billions or hundreds of billions, it's, it's, it's hard to manage Single digit millions or, or 10 or twenty million, uh, with the same, um, attention, uh, and, uh, and the same oversight that you have on managing a five hundred million or a billion dollar position. Um, and I think that therein is the opportunity for artisanal or boutique or, or smaller VCs where it does matter to them. And, um, And a partner can bring the required attention for the required period of time to help you build your business.

AI assessment note: “I think that the Andreessen's and the Sequoia's of this world... have become more institutionalized”

Q I totally agree and get you there. Would you ever back a founder where you think the founder's great, but the market's horrible?

A I would, um, try get that founder to understand why I don't like the market. Um, and if I can, and that founder chooses a different market, then I'll try back them. In some cases, like in, in SeatGeek, they They started selling tickets, and then they found a wedge of getting in, they bought a company out of Israel called TopTex, which, uh, which provided software for, uh, event spaces and, and clubs to, to manage their ticketing. And that wedge, uh, got built into a big business. Here again, Monday.com is another one where they, they, they went after a kind of a general market, right? But they figured out a wedge. You know, that was a wedge, and now the big businesses in that is Monday Dev, which competes with Jira and things like that, and Monday CRM, which completes with Salesforce and Pipedrive and things like that, and they've built big markets.

AI assessment note: “if that founder chooses a different market, then I'll try back them.”

Q Okay. Got you. There's this idea that you're not able to concentrate capital into your winners. It's like, I often hear it, which is like, well, that model doesn't work because if it's really working, Sequoia or Andreessen or whoever will just come in and just take the A and you won't see any of it. Is that incorrect, do you think?

A I don't think it's entirely incorrect. I think today you want to generally get the next round done by a fund that can do that, the round after that. So if you get a fund in to do the A, you want to know as a founder that the fund that's doing your A can do your B, can lead your B, because you don't know where the world will be in two, three years later, and you want your investors to be able to continue, and also continue when the chips are down, when, when things aren't great. And, and what we've found is that many times we've Lead the seed and lead the A in companies that, that weren't executing at the best, uh, at the best time. Um, but naturally what happens is that if you are, um, doing extremely well, then inherently you'll gravitate to tier one funds who want to lead and who write a bigger check and, you know, um, and we'll carry on. And we've kind of feel that, um, Playing together is better in the long term of the, in the long term interest of the business.

AI assessment note: “I don't think it's entirely incorrect.”

Q Was there ever a time when Monday didn't look good? Was it just a rocket ship from day one?

A No, the first, the first eight, nine months of Monday, we, we didn't have product market fit. I remember we had like six customers and we had six months of cash left and, um, and, and, and then there was the breakthrough of, of, uh, hitting product market fit. Um, but then again, everyone shied away because of, uh, the market segment. They weren't going off to enterprise first. And in retrospect, we should have gone off to the enterprise maybe a year earlier than we did, but once we started the initial touch points of doing, ah, enterprise, then we did the B, which Jeff at Insight had the foresight to lead, and it was a runaway success from there, but, but even going to the C, the D, the E, the, the big funds, the, the, the tier one, so to speak, were, were always elusive. They, they, uh, there was always a question, and, and I think, um, that's how we ended up being such large shareholders of Monday, and fortunate enough to be with the business along the way. Um, initially spending a lot of time with the business, but as it grew, spending less, but, but being around the table, and I'm, I'm extremely fortunate to be a board member of, of Monday as a public company today.

AI assessment note: “No, the first, the first eight, nine months of Monday, we, we didn't have product market fit.”

Q Was there ever a time when Monday didn't look good? Was it just a rocket ship from day one?

A No, the first, the first eight, nine months of Monday, we, we didn't have product market fit. I remember we had like six customers and we had six months of cash left and, um, and, and, and then there was the breakthrough of, of, uh, hitting product market fit. Um, but then again, everyone shied away because of, uh, the market segment. They weren't going off to enterprise first. And in retrospect, we should have gone off to the enterprise maybe a year earlier than we did, but once we started the initial touch points of doing, ah, enterprise, then we did the B, which Jeff at Insight had the foresight to lead, and it was a runaway success from there, but, but even going to the C, the D, the E, the, the big funds, the, the, the tier one, so to speak, were, were always elusive. They, they, uh, there was always a question, and, and I think, um, that's how we ended up being such large shareholders of Monday, and fortunate enough to be with the business along the way. Um, initially spending a lot of time with the business, but as it grew, spending less, but, but being around the table, and I'm, I'm extremely fortunate to be a board member of, of Monday as a public company today.

AI assessment note: “No, the first, the first eight, nine months of Monday, we, we didn't have product market fit.”

Q How do you think about the ability to sustain a company through multiple droughts of financing? So I, I get you in terms of patient capital in terms of waiting, but companies run out of money, and if the market doesn't come into fruition in the way that you think it will, you can't carry a company forever, or can you?

A Well, no, you, you certainly can't carry a company forever, but, ah, if you have conviction And you're a salesman and a company plans properly in terms of its finances. There are milestones along the way where you can take different decisions. And so you can conserve capital, um, or you can spend capital more quickly. And I think the, the trick is with companies is to figure out at where those milestones are and, And with which forks you are in the way and, and choosing the right fork. And then you need a fair amount of luck because there, you know, there are a lot of investors out there and it's a, it's a challenge, but you can plan on how to approach which founders, which VCs at which time or which strategic investors at which time to get, um, to get funding to, to hopefully succeed.

AI assessment note: “no, you, you certainly can't carry a company forever, but”

Q so I did, but I do want to talk about Monday, because I spoke to Aaron before the show, fascinating chat, yeah, um, and I'd love to just start with that, like, how did you build conviction in Monday, when respectfully, SMBs was like, no, that's not a good market, CRM was like, no, that's not a good market, How did you see goodness when everyone else saw unattractive market?

A Starting off with Monday, um, the last business that I built myself was a SaaS product for the GRC market, governance compliance market, and I wanted to build it very open, but then we were using Microsoft SQL Server, you know, it was the early 2000, AWS wasn't around, you know, there were so many limitations, and I, and, and we built a successful business which we sold, but my vision was to build it In such a way that it wasn't vertical, uh, it would start vertical in Jersey, but move horizontal to other areas. And then Monday came along and I saw Monday and in that I saw everything that I wanted to build, but, but fleshed out so much better and no limitations because of AWS and things like that. And other VCs, other people saw Yammer or Slack or Or something like that. Um, and so, um, we were in, in, in the first round of, of Monday, and.

AI assessment note: “in that I saw everything that I wanted to build, but, but fleshed out”

Q How do you think about the ability to sustain a company through multiple droughts of financing? So I, I get you in terms of patient capital in terms of waiting, but companies run out of money, and if the market doesn't come into fruition in the way that you think it will, you can't carry a company forever, or can you?

A Well, no, you, you certainly can't carry a company forever, but, ah, if you have conviction And you're a salesman and a company plans properly in terms of its finances. There are milestones along the way where you can take different decisions. And so you can conserve capital, um, or you can spend capital more quickly. And I think the, the trick is with companies is to figure out at where those milestones are and, And with which forks you are in the way and, and choosing the right fork. And then you need a fair amount of luck because there, you know, there are a lot of investors out there and it's a, it's a challenge, but you can plan on how to approach which founders, which VCs at which time or which strategic investors at which time to get, um, to get funding to, to hopefully succeed.

AI assessment note: “Well, no, you, you certainly can't carry a company forever”

Q Okay, so I'm just fascinated that when you think about that, and I mean this in total respect to like, you know, TJ and PillPack, but like, and then the fifteen million dollars that you get from like a PillPack style, does that not just prove the complete outlier nature of venture? And does it not just prove like the only thing that matters is being in your next Mondays?

A We're extremely fortunate and lucky to make two million on a deal or one and a half billion on a deal. It's the point is for us, it's a passion. And for us, it's the ability to work hard. And sometimes I'll get a bad rep because sometimes I can be a bit harsh with, with, with my founders and things like that. But we live it, we breathe it, we love it, we have passion for it and we do it out of love. And, and we think that the playing that game with, with that kind of passion is, is something that maybe sets us apart from some of the other players. It doesn't make us a pure financial player. Uh, we're looking for the business to succeed. We're looking for the business to do well, uh, ahead of the financial return we get. We kind of think that if the business succeeds, we'll be okay. Um, and a very different approach.

AI assessment note: “It's the point is for us, it's a passion.”

Q Okay, so I'm just fascinated that when you think about that, and I mean this in total respect to like, you know, TJ and PillPack, but like, and then the fifteen million dollars that you get from like a PillPack style, does that not just prove the complete outlier nature of venture? And does it not just prove like the only thing that matters is being in your next Mondays?

A We're extremely fortunate and lucky to make two million on a deal or one and a half billion on a deal. It's the point is for us, it's a passion. And for us, it's the ability to work hard. And sometimes I'll get a bad rep because sometimes I can be a bit harsh with, with, with my founders and things like that. But we live it, we breathe it, we love it, we have passion for it and we do it out of love. And, and we think that the playing that game with, with that kind of passion is, is something that maybe sets us apart from some of the other players. It doesn't make us a pure financial player. Uh, we're looking for the business to succeed. We're looking for the business to do well, uh, ahead of the financial return we get. We kind of think that if the business succeeds, we'll be okay. Um, and a very different approach.

AI assessment note: “It doesn't make us a pure financial player. Uh, we're looking for the business”

Q So final, final, final one then. What, what actually happens from here? Do you not just breed a generation of Palestinians that continue to hate Israel and Jews?

A There has to be a change. You know, uh, Israel has to have fixed borders, um, because, um, set and fixed borders, uh, enables you to operate legitimately, um, in a, in, as a nation state, right? Um, Um, and I think that the Palestinians need real leadership, and I think the world needs to use, stop using the Palestinians as a scapegoat. Um, and, and I think that everyone has to be a bit mature and, and, and come to agreements, whatever they are, um, that, that will promote peace. I'm a patriot. I believe in my country. I'm a, I'm a Zionist. Um, And I have to take a stand, and if I don't, who will? Um, and, and in humanity, humanity's progress is us leaving, uh, for the next generation, the world which is slightly better than the world we found. Um, and so, you know, that's what we want to do, and that's why I help, um, uh, and others like me help, uh, folks And help the evacuees, the, you know, the hostages, the, um, uh, you know, the soldiers' families, the, um, building resilience, um, trying to protect our country better, and, you know, helping the army if, if it needs help. We've got to get to the next step, and, and, and this, you know, and that's why I say to you, anti-Semitism, the first part of the answer I gave you about Israel society And the future that we want for our children, you take these three circles and you put them, there's an overlap in the middle somewhere…

AI assessment note: “There has to be a change. You know, uh, Israel has to have fixed borders”

Q So final, final, final one then. What, what actually happens from here? Do you not just breed a generation of Palestinians that continue to hate Israel and Jews?

A There has to be a change. You know, uh, Israel has to have fixed borders, um, because, um, set and fixed borders, uh, enables you to operate legitimately, um, in a, in, as a nation state, right? Um, Um, and I think that the Palestinians need real leadership, and I think the world needs to use, stop using the Palestinians as a scapegoat. Um, and, and I think that everyone has to be a bit mature and, and, and come to agreements, whatever they are, um, that, that will promote peace. I'm a patriot. I believe in my country. I'm a, I'm a Zionist. Um, And I have to take a stand, and if I don't, who will? Um, and, and in humanity, humanity's progress is us leaving, uh, for the next generation, the world which is slightly better than the world we found. Um, and so, you know, that's what we want to do, and that's why I help, um, uh, and others like me help, uh, folks And help the evacuees, the, you know, the hostages, the, um, uh, you know, the soldiers' families, the, um, building resilience, um, trying to protect our country better, and, you know, helping the army if, if it needs help. We've got to get to the next step, and, and, and this, you know, and that's why I say to you, anti-Semitism, the first part of the answer I gave you about Israel society And the future that we want for our children, you take these three circles and you put them, there's an overlap in the middle somewhere…

AI assessment note: “It's not clear to me today, sitting here, what it is. Um, I wish I knew.”