May 27, 2024 · 1h 24m · news
Jason Lemkin: Why Pricing is Worse Than Ever and There is More Funding Than Ever | E1157 · 20VC with Harry Stebbings
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In this comprehensive interview, SaaStr founder Jason Lemkin joins Harry Stebbings to dissect modern venture capital dynamics, sharing critical lessons on early-stage due diligence, fund mathematics, founder commitment, and the changing landscape of SaaS valuations and private equity.
How this conversation actually went
Every chapter scored 0–10 on four independent dynamics. Hover any point for the reasoning behind the score. Harry holds 11.1% of the talking time here. How this is scored →
speaking balance: gold is Harry, purple is the guest (3 minute bins)
When Harry states he hates investing in competitive markets, Jason directly reframes competition as a positive for hyper-agile teams and warns that running from crowded markets misses iconic outliers.
Hardest push from Harry ▶ 26:10 Harry forcefully questions PE buyout returnsHarry aggressively pushes back on PE acquisitions of Pipedrive and Zendesk, arguing that high customer decay and lack of innovation make it impossible for PE firms to make money.
Biggest teaching moment ▶ 12:59 Jason breaks down seed dilution and venture return realitiesJason educates Harry on realistic 50 percent seed dilution down to IPO and explains why fund managers must target multi-billion dollar exits to generate meaningful carry.
Harry holds his own ▶ 54:51 Harry presents live portfolio churn metricsHarry demonstrates deep operational familiarity by citing real-time data from an active deal where monthly churn jumped from 2.6 percent to 5.6 percent, driving the conversation on SMB volatility.
the scores for every segment, with the reasoning behind each
| Chapter | Topic | Harry as informed peer | Guest teaching | Guest disagreement | Harry pushing back | Why |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Welcome and "Funny VC" Show Format | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Warm opening and introduction of the 'Funny VC' review format. Lemkin outlines his top exits by cash versus NAV, while Stebbings facilitates the conversational setup. | |
| Lessons from SalesLoft: Commitment and Binary Teams | 3 | 5 | 2 | 1 | Lemkin shares core learnings from SalesLoft regarding extreme founder commitment and binary co-founder pairs. Stebbings agrees with the difficulty of venture returns. | |
| Modern Due Diligence: Screening the CTO Early | 4 | 6 | 1 | 2 | Lemkin explains his shift to screening CTOs early in the diligence process. Stebbings asks tactical questions about how to extract CTO insights in short meetings. | |
| CEO vs. CTO Dynamics and the Reality of Dilution | 4 | 7 | 2 | 2 | Lemkin breaks down the math of 50% seed dilution on the path to IPO and the difficulty of driving fund returns. Stebbings asks whether Lemkin would still invest if the CTO is weak. | |
| Benchmarking World-Class CTOs and the Minimalist Management Rule | 5 | 6 | 2 | 2 | Stebbings mentions interviewing 15 customer references in a day while Lemkin explains software performance red flags at $1M ARR. Lemkin advises asking Columbo-style open questions. | |
| Embracing Competition: Why Great Founders Win in Crowded Markets | 5 | 6 | 4 | 5 | Stebbings directly states his hatred for investing in competitive markets. Lemkin counters forcefully, arguing that avoiding competition causes VCs to miss outliers like Datadog and Rippling. | |
| Case Study: Pipedrive, HubSpot, and Exiting When Founders Leave | 4 | 6 | 3 | 2 | Lemkin reviews Pipedrive's exit to Vista and outlines his strict rule to exit positions when founders step down. Stebbings emphatically supports selling when founders depart. | |
| PE Bubble Deals, LP Mulligans, and Knowing When to Sell | 6 | 5 | 3 | 8 | Stebbings strongly challenges whether private equity buyers will make money on Pipedrive and Zendesk given current decay and churn rates. Lemkin responds by discussing LP mulligans and exit timing. | |
| HubSpot's Multi-Product Success and the 10% Market Share Expansion Rule | 5 | 7 | 2 | 2 | Lemkin presents his rule that crossing 10% market share in a core ICP requires a company to launch a second act. Stebbings asks how to balance core market focus versus founder expansion goals. | |
| Jason's Biggest Losses: Stubborn Founders and Blind Follow-on Checks | 4 | 6 | 2 | 3 | Lemkin reflects on his largest capital loss resulting from writing a third follow-on check with insufficient diligence into misreported financials. Stebbings probes on the mechanics of doubling down. | |
| Anti-Fraud Diligence: Screening for Bullshit with Bank Statements | 5 | 5 | 4 | 6 | Lemkin advocates requesting bank statements early to screen for financial discrepancies. Stebbings pushes back on the friction this creates with founders who might tell investors to bugger off. | |
| Growth Trajectory: The Triple, Triple, Double, Double Metric | 5 | 7 | 2 | 2 | Lemkin reiterates the necessity of the triple, triple, double, double metric for public market trajectory. Stebbings asks specifically what monthly growth and churn rates trigger investor interest. | |
| Outlier Valuations and the Inside Capital Flood | 5 | 6 | 3 | 3 | Lemkin describes how insider capital floods outlier companies, distorting valuations beyond reasonable metrics. Stebbings asks whether taking insider capital ultimately harms or helps portfolio companies. | |
| Structured Rounds and the Fate of "Zombie" Public SaaS Companies | 6 | 6 | 3 | 4 | Stebbings identifies structured rounds and asks what becomes of zombie public SaaS companies like Dropbox and Twilio. Lemkin explains private equity interest and high operating margin cash engines. | |
| The Rule of Retention: Enterprise NRR and the Limits of SMB Churn | 7 | 6 | 2 | 3 | Stebbings shares live data from an active deal pipeline showing churn jump from 2.6% to 5.6%. Lemkin breaks down enterprise NRR requirements versus acceptable SMB churn limits. | |
| Burn Ratios, Efficiency, and the Trap of Enterprise Execs in SMB Models | 4 | 7 | 2 | 2 | Lemkin breaks down the Burn Ratio and warns against placing enterprise executives into SMB SaaS models. Stebbings asks for specific acceptable burn levels for $1M ARR SMB companies. | |
| AI Hype Cycles, Valuation Hubris, and Why Seed Investing Is Broken | 6 | 7 | 4 | 4 | Lemkin argues seed investing is systemically broken due to inflated YC caps and fund sizing math. Stebbings sets valuation boundaries, maintaining he avoids $150M seed pricing. | |
| Learning from RevenueCat Investment | 4 | 5 | 1 | 2 | Lemkin shares learnings from his RevenueCat investment, including misinterpreting GMV as ARR pre-YC. Stebbings asks about entry valuation and ownership dynamics. | |
| Mistakes of 2021, a $5 Million Loss, and End-of-Fund Learnings | 5 | 5 | 2 | 3 | Lemkin discusses a $5M write-off where founders fired their sales team despite $15M in the bank. Stebbings adds that a good deal valuation does not equal a good investment. | |
| Quick-Fire: Underrated SaaS CEOs and the Klaviyo Phenomenon | 6 | 5 | 2 | 2 | During quick-fire, Lemkin highlights ServiceTitan and Klaviyo as underrated powerhouses. Stebbings corrects market cap details live during the exchange. | |
| Private Equity-Owned SaaS and Legacy Companies | 6 | 5 | 3 | 5 | Stebbings delivers a sharp critique of Anaplan, calling it a terrible product getting eaten by Pigment. Lemkin explains what happens when software companies stop innovating. | |
| Venture Fund Allocation Advice and Managing LP Challenges | 5 | 7 | 3 | 2 | Stebbings poses a hypothetical LP fund allocation scenario across Seed, Series A, and Growth. Lemkin advises individuals against fund investing and dissects GP economics. |