Gleicher: High impermeable perimeter security fails because defenders hold internal strategic advantages
Nathaniel Gleicher · a16z Podcast | Changing the Conversation about Cybersecurity · Jan 2, 2019 · at 9:24
Nathaniel Gleicher uses the Secret Service's physical protection model to illustrate why defenders should focus on controlling internal environments rather than perimeter barriers.
0:00 / 0:18exact quote · 18.6s
▶ Watch the full episode on YouTube → 720p mp4 · rendered on demand · StarZero watermark
“A very high impermeable perimeter doesn't work. And in fact, at the perimeter, the defender has the greatest disadvantage. The intruder can keep trying to get over it. Once the intruder gets over the fence and into your environment, they're in an environment that, in theory, you as the defender control, which is where you have the greatest advantage.”
quote is from the automated transcript, cleaned for reading: filler sounds and stutters are removed, nothing is rephrased. names can be misheard (the analysis reads context, assessments check outside sources). how →
More from Nathaniel Gleicher
Gleicher: The statistic that 60% of cyberattacked small businesses fail is baseless
“There's a statistic that's been going around. It was used in a couple of cybersecurity bills recently. It was used on the Hill. And the statistic is, 60% of small businesses that get targeted with a cyber attack go out of business within six months. And in cas…”
Gleicher: The primary cyber threat is persistent trust degradation, not catastrophic attacks
“We tend to imagine that getting inside is the big problem, and that once they get inside, there's this risk of this big, massive institution-ending event, and that is certainly possible. But much more frequent is the steady, low-grade degradation of trust in t…”
Gleicher: Nuclear deterrence is a flawed analogy for cybersecurity threats
“Nuclear deterrence is built around the model of a sovereignty ending massive event as opposed to constant low-grade threat. It really doesn't map very well.”
Gleicher: Cybersecurity defenders will eventually balance out attacker advantages
“If you look historically at technologies that have upended conflict and made it much easier to be an attacker than a defender, there are any number of these throughout history, from armor in World War II to gunpowder in sort of the 16th century in Europe, and …”